A Neo-Fisherian Challenge and Reconciliation

 Lars Svensson has a very interesting challenge to the Neo-Fisherian view. (See link for slides.) 

What happens to inflation and unemployment when the central bank (for no good reason) raises the policy rate by 175 bp?...

Sweden did, which provides  

..a natural experiment of the neo-Fisherian view: Does inflation really increase after a policy-rate increase? 

Despite roughly the same circumstances as many other countries, including the US, Sweden in 2010 raised rates 175 bp. (Top left graph). The result: Inflation fell, the exchange rate appreciated. Unemployment also rose (not shown).  

Budish Covid-19 update

Eric Budish has an update to his excellent Covid-19 paper. Eric has a few deep central insights about pandemic management, which necessarily joins economics and epidemiology. 

Keep your eyes on R<1. 

The reproduction rate R -- how many people the average person who gets the disease passes it on to -- is really the only thing that matters. When R>1 the disease grows, initially exponentially, then only tailing off when a large (half or more) of the population is either immune or dead. When R<1, the disease tails off. The costs of the disease grow enormously when R>1. Once R<1, further reductions in R don't really do much good. 

From a public health perspective, you don't have to stop all transmission. Just get R less than one.  

Thus, The goal of pandemic policy must be to maximize the economy (maximize utility, if you're an economies) while keeping R<1. 

The costs of changing R are so smooth, and the benefits so nonlinear, we might as well treat R<1 as a constraint. 

..the formulation provides economics language for a policy middle ground between society-wide lockdown and ignore-the-virus, and a new infectious threat response paradigm alongside “eradicate” and “minimize”.

Important simple insights: 

the R ≤ 1 constraint imposes a disease- transmission budget on society. Society should optimally spend this budget on the activities with the highest ratio of utility to disease-transmission risk, dropping activities with too low a ratio of utility to risk. 

Contra most epidemiologists, you don't shut down everything. You accept risk, and even some transmission, where it is important. From my priorities, keeping business and school open is more important than bars nightclubs and parties, but gustibus do matter here. Market value is a good test however.    

Second, masks, tests, and other simple interventions increase activities’ utility-to-risk ratios, and hence expand how much activity society can engage in and utility society can achieve while staying within the R ≤ 1 budget. 

This is a deeply important point, which I really had not grasped: 

Do not evaluate the value of mask-wearing by how much it can reduce the spread of disease. Evaluate the value of mask-wearing by the vale of activities we can open up, while keeping the disease spread constant.  

1933 lessons for today

Nov 11, Eric Leeper presented "Recovery of 1933" with Margaret  Jacobson and  Bruce Preston, at the Hoover "Road Ahead for Central Banks" series, and it was my pleasure to discuss it. This is a really important and insightful paper.  

Since Japan hit the zero bound more than 25 years ago, economists have been thinking about how to avoid deflation. The answer seems obvious -- "helicopter money," or "unbacked fiscal expansion." But this has proved remarkably hard to do. Jacobson, Leeper and Preston show us how the Roosevelt Administration managed a credible unbacked fiscal expansion, and it bears important lessons today. 

Sumner review of Strategies for Monetary Policy

Scott Sumner posted an excellent  Review of Strategies for Monetary Policy (Book information and, yes free pdfs here). By "excellent," I don't mean he agrees with everything, especially that I wrote! He read the whole thing, including comments, and provides a concise summary along with insightful critique. I won't try to summarize his summary -- it's all good. 

The book summarizes last year's conference on monetary policy at Hoover, which focused on the Fed and ECB policy reviews. This year's analogue is unfolding via zoom,  and has had a really interesting set of papers and discussions. More coverage will follow.  

Rhetoric of economic policy -- Biden plan analysis

Last week saw four interesting statements by economists regarding the economic effects of Biden economic plans. 

My focus will be "An Analysis of Vice President Biden’s Economic Agenda: The Long Run Impacts of Its Regulation, Taxes, and Spending" by  Timothy Fitzgerald, Kevin Hassett, Cody Kallen and Casey Mulligan, a 50 page report. (Yes, hosted by the Hoover Institution, my employer). The Wall Street Journal gave it major coverage in its editorial page, offering a thoughtful summary.   

I  contrast that piece with  a letter  signed by 13 Nobel-Prize winning economists  endorsing Biden's economic policies. A separate open letter  signed by 1072 regular economists wrote, and a similar Economists for Trump letter.   

I am a bit late to the game, as it took me a while to read the weighty Hoover report. However, unlike letter writers, I have no illusions that my opinions will sway the election. 

And, if the polls are right and Biden wins, the question of just what Biden's policies will be, and their economic effects, will have perhaps greater resonance after the election than in the Biden vs. Trump choice of the election.  As they formalize, debate, and institutionalize the plans, surely quantitative analysis of the likely outcomes will matter.  

I highlight this report not because of its contribution to the issue of the day. This report marks a dramatic innovation in rhetoric, how economists analyze political plans. The authors really have started a revolution in policy analysis. This was evident in their previous work at the CEA, but the report highlights it. 

*****

The report. 

The deep innovation: This is entirely, and appropriately, a neoclassical analysis. This report shows you how to do serious, quantitive, applied, large-scale detailed and transparent incentive-based analysis. 

(I use "incentive-based" as a clearer and less charged word than "neoclassical" these days. It gets to the central point.) 

This report puts the neoclassical growth model at the center of policy analysis, rather than the simple Keynesian ISLM model. And that's exactly appropriate for permanent long-run policies, not short-run get out of a depression policies. 

Podcast with Ed Glaeser

A podcast conversation with Harvard's Ed Glaeser, a if not the top economist who does urban affairs.   Does Zoom mean we all work from home? Will cities bounce back? Will San Francisco and New York fade and smaller cities grow? What problems are the policies causing and can cities reverse downward spirals? How to help unfortunate people who live in cities? Join us for a fast paced discussion with a leader in the field.

This is a follow up to a previous podcast on cities. 

Update: Courtesy Marginal Revolution the SF Chronicle on "rampant brazen shoplifting," (solve for the equilibrium, as MR likes to say) 

a man wearing a virus mask walked in, emptied two shelves of snacks into a bag, then headed back for the door. As he walked past the checkout line, a customer called out, “Sure you don’t want a drink with that?”

The Walgreens is shutting down -- which hardly matters as the shelves were bare anyway

Also in the Chronicle, Burglars switch to homes in S.F. as tourists, and their cars, stay away  on a spike in residential burglary, even while people are in their homes. 

Ed and I talked about a spiral, crime, high taxes, people leave, businesses leave, amenities leave, which can be irreversible. 

What you believe depends on where you stand, apparently.

Or, talking your book on surveys. 

Political Polarization and Expected Economic Outcomes by Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Michael Weber is a fascinating working paper on the election. 

...despite wanting different things, voters should be able to broadly agree on the likelihood of different electoral outcomes..

Nope. 

87% of Democrats expect Biden to win while 84% of Republicans expect Trump to win. Importantly, this stark disagreement does not reflect two sets of partisan voters each foreseeing a close election that just barely breaks their way. Among Republicans, the average probability they assign to Trump winning is 76%, with more than one in five saying that Trump will win with 100% probability. Among Democrats, the average probability assigned to Biden winning is 74%, with almost 15% of them saying that Biden will win with 100% probability. 

Less surprising:

Republicans expect a fairly rosy economic scenario if Trump is elected but a very dire one if Biden wins. Democrats ... expect calamity if Trump is re- elected but an economic boom if Biden wins. 

Perhaps of course that economic forecast is why each group votes the way they do, and the conditional distribution should go the other ways -- given which president you think will be a calamity, you vote for the other one. 

Normally I am a bit skeptical about surveys -- they measure what people respond on surveys. Surely people don't mean 100% chance of my candidate wining in the same way they assess the probability of the car breaking down on the way to work. But here measuring what people respond on surveys is quite interesting! If people respond 100% chance of their candidate winning, the same people's response that 100% chance of the stocks they bought going up makes more sense. We learn what "likely" means in casual conversation, compared to "true-measure conditional probability." 

So, I can forecast with 100% probability, the libertarian revolution is coming in 2024! 

Update: 

It would be interesting to document the same pattern with media and pollsters. Informally they seem to confuse "is likely to win" with "who I want to win." 

Virtual finance theory seminar

I'm giving "A fiscal theory of monetary policy with partially-repaid long-term debt" at the virtual finance theory seminar, Wed Oct 28 at 1 PM EDT. Brett Green leads off with "Due Diligence" at 12 PM EDT. If interested, come join. Warning: this is an academic theory paper whose whole point is to look at equations. 

The link has an email address which I don't want to post here, email for a zoom invitation. 

This is an excellent seminar series and one of the first of the new international zooms, which are an exciting development. Thanks to Linda Schilling for organizing.

The Philadelphia Statement

 While we're at it, The Philadelphia Statement is another effort to broadcast the value of free speech and open inquiry, with 15163 signatories so far.  A few choice quotes: 

Our liberty and our happiness depend upon the maintenance of a public culture in which freedom and civility coexist—where people can disagree robustly, even fiercely, yet treat each other as human beings—and, indeed, as fellow citizens—not mortal enemies. 

And not just as morally deplorable by virtue of disagreement. We need to listen, not silence.  

... As Americans, we desire a flourishing, open marketplace of ideas, knowing that it is the fairest and most effective way to separate falsehood from truth.

Not an army of censors at internet companies. Concrete objections: 

Open letter on campus culture

Adam Ellwanger, Professor of English at the University of Houston, has organized an important open letter on campus culture. It has hundreds of signatories. You can sign too if you wish.  

Campuses have been drifting left for a long time. But, as the letter notes, there is a new qualitative difference, that the bureaucratic machinery now compounds what was just social and to some extent professional (don't hire conservatives) pressure among the faculty. 

... campus groupthink ...  is enshrined and encoded in the protocols and procedures of university governance. ... administrative structures now investigate and prosecute deviations from orthodoxy through formal and informal exercises of institutional power.

Nobel guess

Covid has really hurt the annual Nobel Prize gossip in economics circles. Here's my guess: Claudia Goldin and Tom Sowell. 

The last several decades have been amazingly productive in economics. There are dozens of economists who have made Nobel-worthy contributions, and the committee has a hard job sorting through just who should get it and when. 

Among these, who has superb, scholarly, innovative research, on issues that everyone cares about at the moment  (as well as on other important issues), demonstrating the power of economics to address important problems, and happens to embody some of the diversity everyone recognizes is missing in our profession? Claudia Goldin and Tom Sowell. 

Sure, their research comes up with uncomfortable answers. That's what good research should do. 

I will surely be wrong. I have yet to correctly predict a Nobel!    

Update:

OECD talk -- rebuilding institutions in the wake of Covid-19

Friday morning I had the pleasure of participating in a session at the OECD, as part of their program on Confronting Planetary Emergencies - Solving Human Problems. I had the tough job of following brilliant remarks by Acting CEA chair Tyler Goodspeed and Ken Rogoff, and discussing great questions all starting at 5 AM. 

FYI here is the text of my prepared remarks. My focus is how to rebuild the competence of our institutions, which failed dismally in this crisis. 

(Update: Video of the event including Tyler Goodspeed's amazing critique,  plus Ken Rogoff's insightful talk. Thanks to Fahim M. from the comment below. Unknown says the audio is available on the main page, but I couldn't find it. )  

Covid and Beyond

John H. Cochrane

Remarks at the OECD, October 9, 2020

I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak today. Looking at some of the background documents, and listening to Tyler, I recognize that our panel is decidedly contrarian to the main views the OECD is pursuing, and those of the stars that you invited for previous panels. It says good things about the OECD that you want to listen to and understand heretical views.

I will try to answer to your question — what lessons should we take from the Covid experience? Many people say that “Covid changes everything.” I do not think the lesson is so radical. But the Covid  experience does, I think, bring to the fore and make urgent underlying problems that we need to address sooner rather than later. My “we” is global, and international institutions such as the OECD have a key role to play in this institutional regeneration. 

My theme is that we witnessed an outcome of grand institutional failure. We must reform our institutions, restore their basic competence, and thereby trust in that competence. We must de-politicize our institutions and insist that they return to the narrow focus of their competence. Trust must be earned. 

This erosion of our institutions has been going on for a long time now. in my view, the populist eruption, as well perhaps as much of the left-wing authoritarian woke eruption, stems from the view that elites don’t know why they are doing. That was laid bare in financial crisis, in many foreign policy misadventures, and laid bare by covid once again.

We are in a "planetary emergency." It is an emergency coming from the decay, or decadence if you will, of our governing institutions. They need to restore basic competence, not to embark on grand new adventures.  

The disease will pass, likely sooner rather than later due to the extraordinary inventiveness of our pharmaceutical and scientific institutions. The heroic efforts of doctors, and the speed with which they have learned to treat covid is remarkable. Diseases always have passed. And economies and societies returned to normal.

Covid -19 is, however, a fire drill, a wakeup call, a warning sign. It is almost perfectly designed to that purpose. It is just serious enough to get our attention, in a way that H1N1, SARS, and Ebola, were not.  But compared to plague, smallpox, typhus, cholera, 1918 influenza, the death rate is tiny.  

There is a virus out there, natural or engineered, that spreads like this one and kills 20% or more of the population. It will come sooner than we think. And we are wildly unprepared.  Ken Rogoff rightly points to a range of other tail events that we are wildly unprepared for. Antibiotic resistant bacteria.   Massive computer failure. Even a small nuclear war. 

Let us look somewhat chronologically at the list of failures in the last year.

Artistic representation of government waste

"...the man‐and‐horse statue outside the FTC, which signifies the government’s heroic battle to strangle trade. " 

Link from Chris Edwards proposed museum of government failures. (The actual title, "Man controlling trade," is almost as good in an unintentional, new-Deal sort of way, but I like Chris' better. )

I was chatting with Chris and nominated the California high speed railway, which will soon be a massive Christo-scale installation, dedicated to the same cause. Imagine arching viaducts looming over the freeways, connected to nothing, like the ruins of Roman aqueducts, but unlike those never used. Like this one.   

San Joaquin River Viaduct

All it needs is a great set of plaques, installed by the new Libertarian governor of the state of Jefferson after secession, and title. "Ruins of the progressive state?" The Pont du Gard it's not, but perhaps the brutalist functionality is better for my artistic purpose. 

(Yes, California really has built expensive overpasses and viaducts before building the roadbed to which they connect, which it will likely never build.  

Question of the day: If California is going to ban internal combustion cars and trucks, just what is the point of the train? It must now be a net carbon producer.)

 

Beat Covid Without a Vaccine

Beat Covid Without a Vaccine, with "frequent rapid at-home testing" write Larry Kotlikoff and Michael Mina in the Oct 2 WSJ. I've made this point many times before, as have Larry, Michael, and many others (Paul Romer especially) but this one is well written and concise, and the issue is so important it bears a bit of repetition and efforts to package the message. 

How would you like the recession to be over in a month? Here's the ticket. A vaccine is a technology for stopping the spread of a virus.  Frequent rapid at-home testing is a technology for stopping the spread of a  virus. And it is one we have now, if only the government will let us use it. 

"At least one such test, Abbott Labs ’ BinaxNOW, is already being produced for the government....

... each is simple enough to be self-administered. With the BinaxNow test, you swab the front of your nose, insert the swab into one side of a small card, add saline to the other side, close the card, and see if the reader on the front lights up green or red. A phone app records a negative result for use as a digital passport."

No doctor visit, no referral, no insurance, no lab, no do you fit the criteria. Just test and see if you're sick. 

"Asking those presumed to be infectious to stay home would cut transmission chains, ending Covid outbreaks within weeks. Each transmission stopped may prevent hundreds more. .... Like vaccines, the tests don’t have to be perfect. It’s enough to drop the virus’s reproductive number (the average number of people each infected person infects) below 1."

Political diversity at the AEA

Mitchell Langbert, writing in Econ Journal Watch documents the ratio of Democrat/Republican Party affiliation and campaign contributions in the American Economic Association. Here is the bottom line

The most interesting part of the paper that the AEA skews more and more Democrat as you look higher up the hierarchy to who has more influence in the organization. 

Fifty shades of QE. Research in the bubble.

It always struck me that research inside the Fed seems to produce answers closer to the views of Fed officials than does research outside of the Fed. Perhaps my experience of reading a speech by Ben Bernanke one morning and attending a workshop by a Fed economist that found exactly his guess of the (implausibly large, to me) effects of QE that afternoon colored my views. 

In "Fifty Shades of QE:" Brian Fabo, Martina Jančoková, Elisabeth Kempf,  and Luboš Pástor quantify this tendency:

...central bank papers report larger effects of QE on output and inflation. Central bankers are also more likely to report significant effects of QE on output and to use more positive language in the abstract. Central bankers who report larger QE effects on output experience more favorable career outcomes. A survey of central banks reveals substantial involvement of bank management in research production.

Figure 5 gives some sense of the result:

"You're hired" Mulligan review

"You're Hired!" is Casey Mulligan's memoir of a year spent as Chief Economist of the Council of Economic Advisers. 

The book is pitched as an analysis of President Trump, "riveting first-hand accounts of President Trump’s engagement with policy and politics." I read it in part for that reason. Opinions on the current occupant generally reflect either kool-aid drinking, never-Trump disdain, or foaming-at-the-mouth derangement. Casey, one of the few remaining true-blue Chicago School economists, and an outstanding one who combines analysis and policy, is none of the above. I know him as a clear thinker and a straight talker.  With an election coming,  I wanted to see what he had to say. 

Casey delivers some important insights about this President. But the book is really not that much about Trump. It is much more about how the CEA works, how policy is formed in the Trump administration, which is much more like other administrations than you'd think, and a record of some great successes of the Trump-era CEA. (Kevin Hassett, the CEA chair, really deserves more pride of place in this story.) Trump shows up to make the big decisions, but usually on issues the CEA has spearheaded. 

For this story, and all the 90% that is not about Trump,  I strongly recommend the book to economists, of all political leanings. If you are an academic, interested in economic policy and in serving your country but without joining the permanent federal bureaucracy, the CEA is the most likely place you will land. If you want a voice for serious economic analysis in the government, the CEA is it. Casey also tells you how the CEA relies on academic research.  

Romer on testing

As part of an email conversation about testing, Paul Romer sent the following message. He so beautifully encapsulated the case for testing, I asked for permission to post his email. Here it is. 

Here is a short summary of the case for testing.

1. A program of "test and isolate" will reduce the effective reproduction number, R.

2. A combined policy of (i) more "test and isolate" which reduces R and (ii) more social interaction and more economic activity which increases R can be designed so that the net effect on R is zero.

3. The ratio of the cost of the additional testing to the additional economic activity that this combined policy will allow offers one way to estimate of the "rate or return" to spending on tests. My rough estimate is that this rate of return lies in the range of 10x to 100x so there is no doubt that test and isolate would be cost effective. To reach the higher end of the range, the cost of the test would have to be relatively low, say  $10.

4. The combined plan under #2 will lead to more total cases. If the main measure of policy success or failure were deaths, an increase in the number of cases would not matter. Under the current circumstances, an increase in the number of cases is likely to be interpreted as a sign of a policy failure. This increases the political cost to the administration of increasing the number of tests. A second-best solution that avoids this cost might be to use at home tests and encourage people to self-isolate. This way, the results from the tests need not generate any new confirmed cases.

[JC Comment: one reluctance that the president or governors may have is that more testing naturally produces more measured cases, and the media don't seem all that good about recognizing this fact.] 

Details on Targeting, Timing, and Compliance:

- Under the program in #3, the benefit created when more infectious people are isolated is received by unknown others who are free to resume normal activities. This is a classic case of an external effect. As a result, it makes sense for the government to pay for the tests and perhaps even to pay for "supported isolation" to increase the compliance rate. Because the fraction of the population that is infected is relatively small and because the required period of isolation is short, it would be relatively inexpensive to pay the few people who are in isolation, for example by making up any lost wages. Because transmission in the household is likely, it would make sense to offer a choice of isolation in a hotel or isolating the entire family at home. However, implementing this would require some way to confirm that someone is infectious, which precludes its use in the at-home approach noted under #4 above.

- For purposes of calculating the rate of return in the combined program described in #3, it is useful to consider a thought experiment of testing people at random. But in any practical program, the efficient way to use more tests is to start by targeting populations that have high ex ante probability of being infected. This could be done by concentrating the tests in high prevalence geographical regions, in high exposure populations, or on people identified by contact tracing. I am skeptical that contact tracing is the cost effective way to identify a large number of people who have a higher ex ante probability of being infected.

- For reducing R, what matters is the average number of infectious-person-days in isolation per test. This depends on (a) the number of true positives that are isolated and (b) when in the course of their infection they are isolated. The way to increase (a) is to target populations with a high ex ante probability of infection. The way to increase (b) is to use tests with a shorter time from sample to result.

- The choice between centralized lab testing and POC tests depends in part on an easily quantified tradeoff between a reduction in the sample-to-result time of most POC tests and a reduction in their sensitivity. But in the early months of any program for expanding the number of tests, the most important differentiator is likely to be the supply response. Many people are convinced that there is a large amount of lab capacity on university campuses that could rapidly be mobilized so that this path probably offers the lowest-cost path of expansion until manufacturing capacity increases for the POC or at home tests.

- There is a synergy between the frequency of testing in a population and the use of pooling to increase lab capacity. As the frequency increases, the frequency of positives will go down so that pooling becomes more cost effective.

-  A large fraction of the total cost of a test comes from the discomfort experienced by the person who gives the sample and the time it takes for a healthcare professional to collect the sample. On both grounds, saliva samples will almost surely have the lowest cost.

- To reduce the cost from isolating false positives, any initial positives could be retested. Because the number of positive results will be a small fraction of the number of tests, retesting adds only a small amount to the cost of the program.

- As long as any true positives are isolated, the net effect of the combined program described in #2 will be to increase the total amount of social interaction by people who are not infectious, even if there are some false positives.

I hope this is helpful. 

Paul. 

 

Muni haircuts

"Municipal bond investors have to share the burden in state bailouts" writes my colleague Josh Rauh, and he is exactly right.

Background: State and local governments borrowed a lot of money and blew it. They borrowed further by not funding their pensions. Now covid comes along, people are fleeing cities, and they don't have tax revenue to fund ongoing expenses. 

The big question hanging over Washington: If we are going to help state and local governments weather the storm of their current expenses, does that mean federal taxpayers bail out the bondholders who lent state and local governments all this money? 

As in the Greek crisis, bond investors and their allies like to clam "contagion," that any losses will spark a financial crisis.  

Whether that argument has any merit in other cases, as Josh points out it does not hold for municipal bonds in the current financial environment. Municipal bonds are illiquid and tax-exempt and thus well targeted at very wealthy high-income individuals who face high tax rates, and whose saving is thus beyond IRA, 401(k) and other tax-free investment possibilities. And we are not in a systemic financial crisis.  

...as of this spring, around 12 percent of municipal bonds were owned by banks. This implies only about $130 billion of total exposure to all general obligation municipal debt by the banking sector, compared to well above $1 trillion of tier one bank capital. Similar amounts of general obligation municipal debt reside on the balance sheets of the insurance companies, where municipal bonds are 7 percent of assets.

The remaining municipal bonds are directly owned by individuals, or in mutual funds and exchange traded funds largely owned by individuals. Municipal bond defaults would primarily affect individual investors, and especially individuals who buy tax exempt municipal debt because they are looking for tax free income.

Of a piece with the effort to restore the state and local tax deduction, the effort to bail largely blue states and cities out of their debts to largely blue high income taxpayers is just a little bit inconsistent with tax the rich and tax their wealth rhetoric.  

Daniel Bergstresser and Randolph Cohen presented a paper a while ago at a Brookings conference, measuring that 42% of municipal bond value was held by the top 0.5% of the income distribution. Now that so many including the Fed are interested in racial justice, similar breakdowns of who holds municipal bonds would be interesting. Given the racial disparity in wealth, it would be astounding if the disparity in municipal bond holding were not very large as well.   

Josh's solution is straightforward: 

Congress has to therefore condition any further bailout funds on shared losses by municipal bond investors. For instance, the law can mandate that state governments pass legislation that would write off a dollar of municipal bond debt for every dollar of additional grants given to a state or local government.

If we ever are to have any sort of market discipline, if a Fed put is not going to protect all large and politically potent issuers and all large and politically potent investors, who got outsized returns for many years by holding risky assets,  from actually taking those losses when it counts, rather than one more taxpayer bailout, this seems like the time and place. 

Municipal bonds are already highly subsidized, by their tax deduction. State and local governments have responded predictably by borrowing a lot. (Universities also get to borrow at municipal bond rates, and effectively use the money to invest in their hedge-fund endowments.) If municipal bonds now enter the too big to fail regime, the subsidy and incentive to over borrow explodes. 

This situation is part of a general conundrum. The government and the Fed has taken on forestalling bankruptcies of large businesses and governments in the covid recession. (Restaurants, small landlords, and other small businesses no. But AAA bond issuers, and municipal bond issuers yes.) 

To forestall a bankruptcy, you do not just lend money for current operations -- you end up taking on past debts.  

Fortunately the recession seems to be ending quickly, because the magnitude of debt that might end up in federal hands under the no-bondholder-may-lose-money regime is pretty frightening. 

Update

French Translation at Vox-fi

Atlas agonistes

A group of Stanford faculty recently circulated, and then posted, an open letter objecting to my Hoover colleague Scott Atlas, who serves as a senior adviser to the Administration on health policy. 

Read the letter. Then come back for a little reading comprehension test.

****

Q1: What specific "falsehoods and misrepresentations" do they accuse Scott of making?

Q2: Which of the following do they claim Scott is publicly denying, contrary to scientific evidence? 

1. Face masks, social distancing, handwashing and hygiene can help to reduce the spread of Covid-19. 
2. Crowded indoor spaces are dangerous. 
3. Asymptomatic people can spread covid-19
4. Testing asymptomatic people can help to slow the spread. 
5. Children can get Covid-19
6. Pandemics can end via herd immunity. Vaccines work, by conferring herd immunity.
7. Letting people get sick is better than a vaccine. 
8. All of the above  

Q3: What specific documented evidence of statements that contravene contemporary scientific consensus do the signatories provide? 

Q4: What role in the Administration do they cite that Scott has, and misuses? 

(Note present tense. Scott is an adviser. We all get to change our minds -- even Dr. Fauci once said face masks were not worth the bother, but the signatories don't seem to feel an "ethical obligation" to play gotcha on that one. What matters is, what is Scott currently advocating in the Administration?) 

*******