I had a great time at the CATO monetary policy conference last week. A brief view on why we're having inflation and the chance it will continue:
Briefly, a helicopter dropped. The Fed fell flat. And here we go. Grumpy got steamed up on this one.
If the embed doesn't work, try the direct link or the above conference link. Greg Ip moderated well, and stick around for insightful comments from Fernando Martin, Mark Sobel, and David Beckworth.
A keynote talk at the FGV EPGE (Brazilian School of Economics and Finance) 60th anniversary conference, program here. Direct link to my talk here (YouTube). (I start at about 4:00 if you're impatient). I plan to turn these thoughts in to an essay at some point. All the conference videos here
The theme: Central banks, and especially the US Fed, are spinning out of control. I trace the history of this expansion, and how little steps taken here and there mushroomed. The decision in 2008 to regulate assets rather than pursue equity-financed banking, and buying huge amounts of assets, are small steps that mushroomed. They are the moment that central banks became the proverbial two year old with a hammer. The end, the natural meaning of "whole of government" approaches, must be the end of central bank independence and their complete politicization.
I did a Rational Reminder podcast and video, focusing on portfolio theory, but also a tour through asset pricing. My hosts Benjamin Felix and Cameron Passmore were unusually well prepared and asked great questions! Video below, or go here for video, podcast, and transcript for people (like me) who read more than listen.
The goodfellows video and podcast returns! Direct link, in case the above embed doesn't work for you.
This week's show is about covid and Afghanistan -- America gives up.
One reason I love doing this show is that I get to ask questions about things like Afghanistan, military history, what is the nature of military defeat, and so on that I don't know much about, but Niall and H.R. know a lot about! There is little in life I enjoy so much as spouting off a hare-brained opinion and then someone really knowledgeable like Niall and H.R. swats it down and turns me around.
Don't miss Niall and H.R. starting at 56:45. I wish I were this eloquent, and I'm proud of my fellow panelists for their deeply knowledgeable empathy.
I gave the UCSD economic roundtable lecture Friday June 11 on inflation and the future of the Fed. It summarizes quickly a number of themes from previous Grumpy writings, and if you enjoy videos you might find it fun. Youtube link in case the above embed does not work.
I happened on the New York Fed website, proclaiming on its landing page that it is now
"...dedicated to understanding and finding solutions to the numerous forms of inequality that communities of color experience and working with communities in our District to address deep-seated inequities,"
in case you want documentation that the Federal Reserve is taking on inequality and racial issues.
This is a conversation with Ryan Bourne, Megan McArdle, and Alex Tabarrok on economics and the year of covid. Direct link if the above embed doesn't work.
The conversation is occasioned by the publication of Ryan's excellent book Economics in One Virus. I am often asked for recommendations of general readable economics books. (i.e. no equations.) This is a gem.
Then I had a nice conversation with Mike Hartmann at The Giving Review, link here with transcript, (slightly edited, please refer to that if you want to quote me. The above is just a screenshot, you have to go to the link).
We explored my view that the US should eliminate the whole non-profit business, most of all the tax deductibility of contributions to non-profits, but also (less importantly) the non-profit corporate form. While many non-profits do a lot of good (my employer!) the system has become obscenely perverted, mostly as a tax-supported vehicle for political action, but also a tax dodge available only to the super duper wealthy, and a means of protection from the market for corporate control for flabby institutions. I trust that genuine useful charities will still attract donations -- maybe more -- from the substitution effect than they lose without tax deductions.
I've long been meaning to gather facts and figures to see if this salty opinion makes as much sense as I think it does, and I'm glad to learn about Philanthropy Daily, a resource that will be helpful.
Oh yes also a great GoodFellows with Bjorn Lomborg on climate. I love talking to Bjorn. He has an extensive command of the facts and science, and he's still an optimist that facts and science will actually make a dent in this debate. As global warming moved to climate change to climate crisis to climate justice to climate risks (financial) I'm less optimistic, but hope must be let out of Pandora's box. Also
Conversation with Tyler podcast interview. Perhaps predictably, the most challenging interview / podcast I've ever done. Video here and embed below
Update:
My comments on efficient markets and active management provoked a lot of email.
I mentioned Jonathan Berk, and should have mentioned his coauthors Rick Green and Jules Van Binsbergen, on how active management can persist even though investors don't make any money on it. The basic idea is really clever: A manager has 5% alpha skill on $10 milllion, i.e. he can earn $500k, but the skill does not scale. So he earns 5%, charges 1% fee, investors get 4%. Investors see his great performance and rush in. Now he has $50 million assets under management. He still earns $500k. He charges 1% fee, and investors get zero alpha. It’s equilibrium – if investors leave, alpha to investors goes up again, and they return. Investors are earning the same zero alpha they get on the index so why not. And that’s about what we see. Fees persist in equilibrium, fees are equal to alpha on average, alpha post fees are about zero, flows follow performance. The seminal paper is "Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets" Jonathan B. Berk, Richard C. Green Journal of Political Economy 2004 112 1269-1295 and a series following, here . It's not a perfect theory, but the glass is nearer full than empty, and it's a lovely supply and demand starting place to understand an industry that persists for decades.
More generally, the average fund earns no alpha, almost guaranteed by free entry. The trouble is distinguishing the good ones from the bad ones, on ex-ante characteristics. The filters used by academics are pretty weak -- past returns, ratings, education of principals etc. On the other hand, now we just move it all up to the meta-game. Picking managers is no different than picking stocks. Skill on skill, alpha on alpha, fees on fees...
The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level is a book I'm writing on that topic. It now has a full draft, here.
Comments, typos, suggestions, complaints, parts you find too easy, part you find too hard, things you think are wrong, parts you find repetitive, parts you find need better connection, things I should add, things I should delete are all most welcome!
About a month ago, Russ Roberts and I had a great conversation about virus, vaccine, and tests for the Econ Talk podcast, and the free market approach. It's out now, here for the podcast, or embedded below and here video on YouTube. The podcast link already has some excellent comments.
Portfolios for long-term investors is an essay that extends a keynote talk I will give Thursday Jan 21 at the NBER "New Developments in Long-Term Asset Management" zoom conference. The link takes you to my webpage with pdf of the essay and the slides for the talk. I'll blog the next draft of the essay, as I want to do it once and I'm sure I'll get lots of comments.
How should long-term investors form portfolios in our time-varying, multifactor and friction-filled world? Two conceptual frameworks may help: looking directly at the stream of payments that a portfolio and payout policy can produce, and including a general equilibrium view of the markets’ economic purpose, and the nature of investors’ differences. These perspectives can rationalize some of investors’ behaviors, suggest substantial revisions to standard portfolio theory, and help us to apply portfolio theory in a way that is practically useful for investors.
I have been remiss in posting links to videos, talks, and podcasts, for those of you who enjoy them. Perhaps you have a long boring drive this weekend and NPR is driving you nuts.
We covered many topics, but the aftermath of the huge government debt now being racked up is possibly the most interesting, at least to me.
Luis is currently a member of the European Parliament. Among many other things he was a PhD student and then professor of economics at the University of Chicago. He's a also a great interviewer. The interview is also available in Spanish, here.
Strategies for Monetary Policy is a new book from the Hoover Press based on the conference by that name John Taylor and I ran last May. (John Taylor gets most of the credit.) This year's conference is sadly postponed due to Covid-19. We'll have lots to talk about May 2021.
At that link, you can see the table of contents and read Chapter pdfs for free. You can buy the book for $14.95 or get a free ebook.
Much of the conference was about the question, what will the Fed do during the next downturn? Here we are, and I think it is a valuable snapshot. Of course I have some self interest in that view.
As long as I'm shamelessly promoting, I'll put in another plug for my related Homer Jones Lecture at the St. Louis Fed, video here and the article Strategic Review and Beyond: Rethinking Monetary Policy and Independence here. That was written and delivered in early March, about 5 minutes before the lookouts said "Iceberg ahead." John and I don't put a lot of our own work into the conference books, but it sparked a lot of thoughts. I am grateful to Jim Bullard and the St. Louis Fed for the chance to put those together.
Monetary policy is back to "forget about moral hazard, rules, strategies and the rest, the world is ending." This is a philosophy that happens quite regularly and now has become the rule and strategy. So strategic thinking about monetary policy is more important than ever. This is a philosophy very much due to John Taylor.
The last part of my Homer Jones paper delves into just what risks the big thinkers of central banking were worried about on the eve of the pandemic. Pandemic was not in any stress test. BIS, BoE, FSB and IMF wanted everyone to start stress testing ... climate change and inequality. This is a story that needs more telling.
Cato took some comments I made in a recent event and produced it into a nice short video, 8 minute overview of where I am, or was last week, on the economics of lockdowns. I clearly need to work on the visuals.
Since it was two against one, and I didn't get a response in, I'll add one unfair late hit. In discussing Huawei, and whether Chinese state planning would allow them "economic dominance" in the next decades, my colleagues jumped to the charge that Huawei equipment would include nasty backdoors that the Chinese government would use to spy on us.
I think here they confused "economic competition" with security competition. The topic was whether state planning could give a nation "economic domination" of anything important. The reply that we need to worry about security implications does not answer the question.
The charge I think has also been overstated. Huawei has every interest to assure people its equipment does not have back doors, and my impression is they convinced the UK pretty well on that. Moreover, the US government is explicit in its desire that Apple and other US companies give the NSA back doors. I would welcome more knowledgeable commentary on this issue before next week.
A video discussion with Niall Ferguson and H.R. McMaster on the Covid-19 situation, focusing on longer-run implications.
I ran out of time on one important point. The US is now playing the 2008 playbook on a grand scale -- bailout, stimulus, Fed printing trillions of cash and lending it to avoid bankruptcy. Apparently "infrastructure stimulus" is next. We're sort of like a 2 year old with a hammer, to which everything looks like a nail.
The danger in what we are doing is likewise that this becomes enshrined as standard pandemic policy for the next time -- shut down the whole economy, print rivers of cash, wait for technology to save us. This episode should be regarded as what not to do, so we have a robust and fast-moving public health response that avoids a shutdown.
Niall and H.R. are quite a bit more guns-ho for Cold War 2 with China than I am, and see the virus as confirmation of that need. I think we'll have more of that discussion in future episodes.
I used the opportunity to put lots of thoughts together in condensed form, on how the Fed and other central banks should approach monetary policy, financial regulation, and ever-expanding mandates. The link is to the html version. It will appear in prettier form in the April St. Louis Fed Review.
The conclusion
Should, and can, the Fed stimulate with strongly negative rates, immense QE asset purchases, and an arsenal of forward guidance speeches? I think not. What sort of target should it follow? A price-level target. The Fed should get out of the business of setting the level of nominal rates and target the price level directly. Price-level control will be much more effective with fiscal policy coordination. The Fed should offer a flat supply curve of interest-paying reserves, open basically to anyone, though the Treasury should take up much of that role directly.
Going forward, the Fed and its international counterparts should disavow the temptation toward ever-expanding mandates and economic and financial dirigisme that would take them to "macroprudential" policy, discretionary credit cycle management, asset price targeting, and exploiting regulatory power to embrace social and political goals… today on climate change and inequality, perhaps tomorrow on immigration, trade restriction, China-isolation, or whatever the smart set at Davos wants to see. Only limited scope of action to areas of agreed technocratic competence will salvage the Fed's, other central banks', and international institutions' useful independence.
Of course this effort arrives with spectacularly bad timing, as nobody is talking about anything but the Covid-19 virus. Still, life does go on, and I don't see anything that is directly contradicted by current events. And perhaps you want to read and think about something other than virus crisis, and issues we will go back to thinking about when it's all over.
In the final section (see the footnotes too) I discovered that our international institutions, BIS, IMF, FSB, and so forth were busy dragging banks into the partisan warfare over green new deal style climate policy and forced redistribution. I took a dim view of that. First of all, the idea that climate and inequality present financial risks is just fanciful. Most importantly these are political minefields that will doom independence.
I think this section holds up well. That the worthies who look in to the future and spot risks to the financial system, and drag banks into accounting for them via stress tests and regulatory accounting, found climate change and inequality the biggest run-provoking risks they could think of, not even mentioning pandemic, tells you volumes about the whole technocratic project.
My online Asset Pricing course is back again, after one more software/administrative change once again threatened its demise. It's still on Canvas, but you have to ask to sign on.
The course is here, University of Chicago Canvas course 23303. To log in and use it, you need to email instructional.design@chicagobooth.edu. The course is open to anyone, not just University of Chicago students. If that doesn't work, email me john dot cochrane at stanford dot edu, and I'll see what's wrong.
The videos, notes, and other materials are still available ungated on my website, here, under the "Asset Pricing" tab.
If all goes well you see this:
Economic note: It's interesting how software depreciates so rapidly, though its physical being depreciates not at all. Perfectly good software stops working as operating systems and machines get "upgraded," as IT departments seem to latch on to new "solutions" every three years, and so forth. Most of my email from before the mid 2000s is gone due to an "upgrade." My website is in the midst of an "upgrade" crisis, and I can't seem to keep the online class going for more than two or three years. There is an interesting economics paper in this. As son of a historian, I feel for the historians of a few hundred years from now who, looking back on our interesting era, will find a blank void, as all of our records are unreadable.
Over the last few weeks we have had a series of discussions at Hoover on the 10th anniversary of the financial crisis and recession. This all happened mostly due to the energy of John Taylor.
The final event on Friday Dec 7 was a Panel Discussion Summary, including Taylor, Shultz, Ferguson, Hoxby, Duffie, and myself, with question and answer. Click the above video.
This was preceded by four smaller discussions. We did not video them, but there are transcripts and presentation materials.
October 19, The causes. (Follow links to a transcript and to the presentation slides.) John Taylor and Monika Piazzesi present and learn discussion on the causes of the financial crisis, emphasizing monetary policy, regulation, and housing.
November 9 The Panic What happened on in the panic of August through November (or so) 2018? Did the actions of government officials help or hurt? Or both? George Shultz and Niall Ferguson present their views and lead the discussion.
December 7 The Recession. Why was the recession so deep? Why wasn't it deeper, repeating the Great Recession? Why did it last so long? Did fiscal stimulus help or hurt? Caroline Hoxby and John Taylor led, focusing on labor markets and stimulus. I added some comments on QE and the lessons of the long zero bound for monetary economics; Bob Hall comments on labor markets and unemployment, Mike Boskin comments on stimulus, and much more
What's distinctive about this series, given all the other conferences and retrospectives?
First, we decided not to have retrospectives from people in power at the time. Many other such meetings are descending into memoirs of how we saved the world. Maybe they did, maybe they didn't. And maybe that's not so interesting, except of course to the parties involved who would like to go down nicely in history.
Second, you will find an effort to trace the intellectual lessons of the last 10 years of thought, not just whether certain actions were right or wrong in context of some eternal truth. We all have learned a great deal in the last 10 years, and opinions are shifting. For example, I discuss how capital, once thought immensely costly and regulation much prefereable, has slowly emerged as not at all costly and the best salve for financial crises. Similar lessons have emerged throughout.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, you will find here many disagreements with the standard narrative and what is becoming the first draft of history, as Ferguson nicely described. No, maybe it wasn't just "greed" and "deregulation." No, maybe our officials contributed to panic as much as they helped to stop it. No, maybe fiscal stimulus and QE did not save the world. No, maybe our super-confident regulators armed with an immensely larger rule book are not ready to save the world again next time. And in each case you will hear contrary views buttressed with facts and thoughtful analysis. Perhaps when the second draft of history is ready to be written this will be a starting place.