OECD talk -- rebuilding institutions in the wake of Covid-19

Friday morning I had the pleasure of participating in a session at the OECD, as part of their program on Confronting Planetary Emergencies - Solving Human Problems. I had the tough job of following brilliant remarks by Acting CEA chair Tyler Goodspeed and Ken Rogoff, and discussing great questions all starting at 5 AM. 

FYI here is the text of my prepared remarks. My focus is how to rebuild the competence of our institutions, which failed dismally in this crisis. 

(Update: Video of the event including Tyler Goodspeed's amazing critique,  plus Ken Rogoff's insightful talk. Thanks to Fahim M. from the comment below. Unknown says the audio is available on the main page, but I couldn't find it. )  

Covid and Beyond

John H. Cochrane

Remarks at the OECD, October 9, 2020

I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak today. Looking at some of the background documents, and listening to Tyler, I recognize that our panel is decidedly contrarian to the main views the OECD is pursuing, and those of the stars that you invited for previous panels. It says good things about the OECD that you want to listen to and understand heretical views.

I will try to answer to your question — what lessons should we take from the Covid experience? Many people say that “Covid changes everything.” I do not think the lesson is so radical. But the Covid  experience does, I think, bring to the fore and make urgent underlying problems that we need to address sooner rather than later. My “we” is global, and international institutions such as the OECD have a key role to play in this institutional regeneration. 

My theme is that we witnessed an outcome of grand institutional failure. We must reform our institutions, restore their basic competence, and thereby trust in that competence. We must de-politicize our institutions and insist that they return to the narrow focus of their competence. Trust must be earned. 

This erosion of our institutions has been going on for a long time now. in my view, the populist eruption, as well perhaps as much of the left-wing authoritarian woke eruption, stems from the view that elites don’t know why they are doing. That was laid bare in financial crisis, in many foreign policy misadventures, and laid bare by covid once again.

We are in a "planetary emergency." It is an emergency coming from the decay, or decadence if you will, of our governing institutions. They need to restore basic competence, not to embark on grand new adventures.  

The disease will pass, likely sooner rather than later due to the extraordinary inventiveness of our pharmaceutical and scientific institutions. The heroic efforts of doctors, and the speed with which they have learned to treat covid is remarkable. Diseases always have passed. And economies and societies returned to normal.

Covid -19 is, however, a fire drill, a wakeup call, a warning sign. It is almost perfectly designed to that purpose. It is just serious enough to get our attention, in a way that H1N1, SARS, and Ebola, were not.  But compared to plague, smallpox, typhus, cholera, 1918 influenza, the death rate is tiny.  

There is a virus out there, natural or engineered, that spreads like this one and kills 20% or more of the population. It will come sooner than we think. And we are wildly unprepared.  Ken Rogoff rightly points to a range of other tail events that we are wildly unprepared for. Antibiotic resistant bacteria.   Massive computer failure. Even a small nuclear war. 

Let us look somewhat chronologically at the list of failures in the last year.

Contract enforcement with costly verification -- Van Halen edition

From the Wall Street Journal Obituary 

A legacy of the band includes its contract riders—requests set as criteria for performance at a venue—particularly power and stage-construction requirements. Van Halen required a bowl of M&M’s to be placed in the band’s dressing room, with the brown candies removed—a test to make sure the contract was honored.

Economists may not be rock stars, but some rock stars are economists!  

RIP

On Re-Education Programs

On Sept 22,  the White House put out an "Executive Order on Combating Race and Sex Stereotyping." Media coverage has been curiously spotty. Reading the primary source is revealing.  

One expects an executive order to consist of a short list of things that can and cannot be done, like a regulation. This one is more of an investigative report, with a philosophical preamble. 

What's in the training programs?

Federal agencies are already implementing programs, on a wide scale. The order tells us a lot about what's in them. No, it is not an unbiased evaluation. But its selection of facts are nonetheless facts. No critic that I have seen has claimed otherwise. 

... the Department of the Treasury recently held a seminar that promoted arguments that “virtually all White people, regardless of how ‘woke’ they are, contribute to racism,” and that instructed small group leaders to encourage employees to avoid “narratives” that Americans should “be more color-blind” or “let people’s skills and personalities be what differentiates them.”..

Training materials from Argonne National Laboratories, a Federal entity, stated that racism “is interwoven into every fabric of America” and described statements like “color blindness” and the “meritocracy” as “actions of bias.”

Materials from Sandia National Laboratories, also a Federal entity, for non-minority males stated that an emphasis on “rationality over emotionality” was a characteristic of “white male[s],” and asked those present to “acknowledge” their “privilege” to each other.

A Smithsonian Institution museum graphic recently claimed that concepts like “[o]bjective, rational linear thinking,” “[h]ard work” being “the key to success,” the “nuclear family,” and belief in a single god are not values that unite Americans of all races but are instead “aspects and assumptions of whiteness.” The museum also stated that “[f]acing your whiteness is hard and can result in feelings of guilt, sadness, confusion, defensiveness, or fear.”

The  regulation, which only comes at the end of the document, is likewise enlightening. Referring to federal contractors, 

The contractor shall not use any workplace training that inculcates in its employees any form of race or sex stereotyping or any form of race or sex scapegoating, including the concepts that (a) one race or sex is inherently superior to another race or sex; (b) an individual, by virtue of his or her race or sex, is inherently racist, sexist, or oppressive, whether consciously or unconsciously; (c) an individual should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment solely or partly because of his or her race or sex; (d) members of one race or sex cannot and should not attempt to treat others without respect to race or sex; (e) an individual’s moral character is necessarily determined by his or her race or sex; (f) an individual, by virtue of his or her race or sex, bears responsibility for actions committed in the past by other members of the same race or sex; (g) any individual should feel discomfort, guilt, anguish, or any other form of psychological distress on account of his or her race or sex; or (h) meritocracy or traits such as a hard work ethic are racist or sexist, or were created by a particular race to oppress another race. The term “race or sex stereotyping” means ascribing character traits, values, moral and ethical codes, privileges, status, or beliefs to a race or sex, or to an individual because of his or her race or sex, and the term “race or sex scapegoating” means assigning fault, blame, or bias to a race or sex, or to members of a race or sex because of their race or sex.

Similar language applies to federal agencies, and recipients of federal grants. Watch out universities. I am also told by friends that the Federal Reserve Board is implementing such training.

On a lake near Chicago I once saw a sign that said  "no radioactive dumping." Well, that's comforting you might say. On second thought, why did they have to put up the sign? 

Artistic representation of government waste

"...the man‐and‐horse statue outside the FTC, which signifies the government’s heroic battle to strangle trade. " 

Link from Chris Edwards proposed museum of government failures. (The actual title, "Man controlling trade," is almost as good in an unintentional, new-Deal sort of way, but I like Chris' better. )

I was chatting with Chris and nominated the California high speed railway, which will soon be a massive Christo-scale installation, dedicated to the same cause. Imagine arching viaducts looming over the freeways, connected to nothing, like the ruins of Roman aqueducts, but unlike those never used. Like this one.   

San Joaquin River Viaduct

All it needs is a great set of plaques, installed by the new Libertarian governor of the state of Jefferson after secession, and title. "Ruins of the progressive state?" The Pont du Gard it's not, but perhaps the brutalist functionality is better for my artistic purpose. 

(Yes, California really has built expensive overpasses and viaducts before building the roadbed to which they connect, which it will likely never build.  

Question of the day: If California is going to ban internal combustion cars and trucks, just what is the point of the train? It must now be a net carbon producer.)

 

Beat Covid Without a Vaccine

Beat Covid Without a Vaccine, with "frequent rapid at-home testing" write Larry Kotlikoff and Michael Mina in the Oct 2 WSJ. I've made this point many times before, as have Larry, Michael, and many others (Paul Romer especially) but this one is well written and concise, and the issue is so important it bears a bit of repetition and efforts to package the message. 

How would you like the recession to be over in a month? Here's the ticket. A vaccine is a technology for stopping the spread of a virus.  Frequent rapid at-home testing is a technology for stopping the spread of a  virus. And it is one we have now, if only the government will let us use it. 

"At least one such test, Abbott Labs ’ BinaxNOW, is already being produced for the government....

... each is simple enough to be self-administered. With the BinaxNow test, you swab the front of your nose, insert the swab into one side of a small card, add saline to the other side, close the card, and see if the reader on the front lights up green or red. A phone app records a negative result for use as a digital passport."

No doctor visit, no referral, no insurance, no lab, no do you fit the criteria. Just test and see if you're sick. 

"Asking those presumed to be infectious to stay home would cut transmission chains, ending Covid outbreaks within weeks. Each transmission stopped may prevent hundreds more. .... Like vaccines, the tests don’t have to be perfect. It’s enough to drop the virus’s reproductive number (the average number of people each infected person infects) below 1."

Political diversity at the AEA

Mitchell Langbert, writing in Econ Journal Watch documents the ratio of Democrat/Republican Party affiliation and campaign contributions in the American Economic Association. Here is the bottom line

The most interesting part of the paper that the AEA skews more and more Democrat as you look higher up the hierarchy to who has more influence in the organization. 

Belgian Doctors' open letter on covid-19

A correspondent sent me a link to the Belgian Doctors' open letter on covid-19. I found it original, documented, and worth reading and thinking about. It is at least an important contribution to a debate -- and one of its big points, we should be having a debate. Science is still quite uncertain about much regarding this disease, and science never did know much about economic and public policy. I'm not totally convinced, but it has several interesting ideas that I had not considered before. 

The headline

We ask for an open debate, where all experts are represented without any form of censorship. After the initial panic surrounding covid-19, the objective facts now show a completely different picture – there is no medical justification for any emergency policy anymore.

The current crisis management has become totally disproportionate and causes more damage than it does any good.

We call for an end to all measures and ask for an immediate restoration of our normal democratic governance and legal structures and of all our civil liberties.

A history 

Fifty shades of QE. Research in the bubble.

It always struck me that research inside the Fed seems to produce answers closer to the views of Fed officials than does research outside of the Fed. Perhaps my experience of reading a speech by Ben Bernanke one morning and attending a workshop by a Fed economist that found exactly his guess of the (implausibly large, to me) effects of QE that afternoon colored my views. 

In "Fifty Shades of QE:" Brian Fabo, Martina Jančoková, Elisabeth Kempf,  and Luboš Pástor quantify this tendency:

...central bank papers report larger effects of QE on output and inflation. Central bankers are also more likely to report significant effects of QE on output and to use more positive language in the abstract. Central bankers who report larger QE effects on output experience more favorable career outcomes. A survey of central banks reveals substantial involvement of bank management in research production.

Figure 5 gives some sense of the result:

"You're hired" Mulligan review

"You're Hired!" is Casey Mulligan's memoir of a year spent as Chief Economist of the Council of Economic Advisers. 

The book is pitched as an analysis of President Trump, "riveting first-hand accounts of President Trump’s engagement with policy and politics." I read it in part for that reason. Opinions on the current occupant generally reflect either kool-aid drinking, never-Trump disdain, or foaming-at-the-mouth derangement. Casey, one of the few remaining true-blue Chicago School economists, and an outstanding one who combines analysis and policy, is none of the above. I know him as a clear thinker and a straight talker.  With an election coming,  I wanted to see what he had to say. 

Casey delivers some important insights about this President. But the book is really not that much about Trump. It is much more about how the CEA works, how policy is formed in the Trump administration, which is much more like other administrations than you'd think, and a record of some great successes of the Trump-era CEA. (Kevin Hassett, the CEA chair, really deserves more pride of place in this story.) Trump shows up to make the big decisions, but usually on issues the CEA has spearheaded. 

For this story, and all the 90% that is not about Trump,  I strongly recommend the book to economists, of all political leanings. If you are an academic, interested in economic policy and in serving your country but without joining the permanent federal bureaucracy, the CEA is the most likely place you will land. If you want a voice for serious economic analysis in the government, the CEA is it. Casey also tells you how the CEA relies on academic research.  

Growth and regulation

Is economic growth inexorably slowing down? Such is the depressing conclusion of Nick Bloom, Chad Jones, John Van Reenen, and Michael Webb, who showed in a very important paper that it is taking more and more effort to find new ideas. It is also the conclusion of Robert Gordon's Rise and Fall of American Growth. They promised us flying cars, and all we get tweets. The marshaling of facts in these and related works is impressive and depressing. 

I'm attracted to the other much more hopeful (maybe) possibility: growth, really the continued betterment of the human condition, is possible, but it is just stymied by the ever-increasing web of law and regulation. 

Along today come two interesting posts courtesy Marginal Revolution (always must-read). The first is narrow, on nuclear power, the second much broader on how bad regulation spreads around the world. 

Romer on testing

As part of an email conversation about testing, Paul Romer sent the following message. He so beautifully encapsulated the case for testing, I asked for permission to post his email. Here it is. 

Here is a short summary of the case for testing.

1. A program of "test and isolate" will reduce the effective reproduction number, R.

2. A combined policy of (i) more "test and isolate" which reduces R and (ii) more social interaction and more economic activity which increases R can be designed so that the net effect on R is zero.

3. The ratio of the cost of the additional testing to the additional economic activity that this combined policy will allow offers one way to estimate of the "rate or return" to spending on tests. My rough estimate is that this rate of return lies in the range of 10x to 100x so there is no doubt that test and isolate would be cost effective. To reach the higher end of the range, the cost of the test would have to be relatively low, say  $10.

4. The combined plan under #2 will lead to more total cases. If the main measure of policy success or failure were deaths, an increase in the number of cases would not matter. Under the current circumstances, an increase in the number of cases is likely to be interpreted as a sign of a policy failure. This increases the political cost to the administration of increasing the number of tests. A second-best solution that avoids this cost might be to use at home tests and encourage people to self-isolate. This way, the results from the tests need not generate any new confirmed cases.

[JC Comment: one reluctance that the president or governors may have is that more testing naturally produces more measured cases, and the media don't seem all that good about recognizing this fact.] 

Details on Targeting, Timing, and Compliance:

- Under the program in #3, the benefit created when more infectious people are isolated is received by unknown others who are free to resume normal activities. This is a classic case of an external effect. As a result, it makes sense for the government to pay for the tests and perhaps even to pay for "supported isolation" to increase the compliance rate. Because the fraction of the population that is infected is relatively small and because the required period of isolation is short, it would be relatively inexpensive to pay the few people who are in isolation, for example by making up any lost wages. Because transmission in the household is likely, it would make sense to offer a choice of isolation in a hotel or isolating the entire family at home. However, implementing this would require some way to confirm that someone is infectious, which precludes its use in the at-home approach noted under #4 above.

- For purposes of calculating the rate of return in the combined program described in #3, it is useful to consider a thought experiment of testing people at random. But in any practical program, the efficient way to use more tests is to start by targeting populations that have high ex ante probability of being infected. This could be done by concentrating the tests in high prevalence geographical regions, in high exposure populations, or on people identified by contact tracing. I am skeptical that contact tracing is the cost effective way to identify a large number of people who have a higher ex ante probability of being infected.

- For reducing R, what matters is the average number of infectious-person-days in isolation per test. This depends on (a) the number of true positives that are isolated and (b) when in the course of their infection they are isolated. The way to increase (a) is to target populations with a high ex ante probability of infection. The way to increase (b) is to use tests with a shorter time from sample to result.

- The choice between centralized lab testing and POC tests depends in part on an easily quantified tradeoff between a reduction in the sample-to-result time of most POC tests and a reduction in their sensitivity. But in the early months of any program for expanding the number of tests, the most important differentiator is likely to be the supply response. Many people are convinced that there is a large amount of lab capacity on university campuses that could rapidly be mobilized so that this path probably offers the lowest-cost path of expansion until manufacturing capacity increases for the POC or at home tests.

- There is a synergy between the frequency of testing in a population and the use of pooling to increase lab capacity. As the frequency increases, the frequency of positives will go down so that pooling becomes more cost effective.

-  A large fraction of the total cost of a test comes from the discomfort experienced by the person who gives the sample and the time it takes for a healthcare professional to collect the sample. On both grounds, saliva samples will almost surely have the lowest cost.

- To reduce the cost from isolating false positives, any initial positives could be retested. Because the number of positive results will be a small fraction of the number of tests, retesting adds only a small amount to the cost of the program.

- As long as any true positives are isolated, the net effect of the combined program described in #2 will be to increase the total amount of social interaction by people who are not infectious, even if there are some false positives.

I hope this is helpful. 

Paul. 

 

Jacobin pandemic

Casey Mulligan tweeted an interesting report on the coronavirus from Jacobin online magazine as "makes the most sense." Given that the Jacobins were 

"the most radical and ruthless of the political groups formed in the wake of the French Revolution, and in association with Robespierre they instituted the Terror of 1793–4."

(google dictionary) the link attracted my eye. (Do these people know history? Or is this intentional? And they're all upset about Trump and "authoritarianism?")  

Indeed, after the predictable throat-clearing editorializing about "disparate impact" and inequality, and despite idiotic question preambles like this one

"Under capitalism, we have become a species that increasingly exploits other creatures and their habitats, and moves in large numbers and with great speed around the globe, making us ripe for a pandemic like this one."

(China is.. capitalist? The plague, cholera, yellow fever, smallpox were... what?) Jacobin editorial board member Nicole Aschoff spurs Harvard professors Katherine Yih  and Martin Kulldorff to interesting, sensible and useful answers. The extreme source of this commonsense gives me some hope. However, read though or skip to my critical comments, as it's not as totally wise as Casey suggests. 

KY: ... I don’t think it’s wise or warranted to keep society locked down until vaccines become available. ..Instead of a medically oriented approach that focuses on the individual patient and seeks (unrealistically) to prevent new infections across the board, we need a public health–oriented approach that focuses on the population  and seeks to use patterns, or epidemiologic features, of the disease to minimize the number of cases of severe disease and death over the long run, as herd immunity builds up.

NA: Like Dr Yih, I am very concerned about the collateral damage of lockdowns. In public health policy, we cannot just consider the present consequences of one single disease. We must think more broadly, considering all short- and long-term health outcomes.

...Another example is school closings. Good education is not only important for academic achievement and financial well-being; it is also critical for the mental and physical health of children and into their subsequent adulthood. Kids have minimal risk from this virus, and it is sad that we are sacrificing our children instead of properly protecting the elderly and other high-risk groups.

(I hate to break it to modern-day Jacobins, but the Trump Administration is basically following this approach. And the disparate impact is precisely brought on by economic lockdown.  ) 

Read on for much common sense. 

However, I don't think this is totally right, and "damn the torpedoes, protect the old folks and let's sail on to herd immunity" is not, I think the right or at least complete answer.  

1) Herd immunity, on its own, is a meaningless concept.  Most people think herd immunity happens when everyone has gotten it, which is false.  A virus stops spreading when the reproduction rate is below one. The reproduction rate combines frequency of contact and fraction of immune in the population. Only that combination matters.

If each infected person meets 3 people and 67% of the population has immunity, the virus stops.  If each infected person meets two people and 51% the population has immunity, the virus stops. If each infected person meets 0.99 people and nobody is immune, the virus stops.  The fraction with immunity on its own is meaningless.

So we need to work on both parts of the equation -- reduce the contact rate and minimum economic and social cost, as well as wait for greater numbers to become immune. 

2) Long term consequences.  The article acknowledges these and moves on. This strikes me as a great unknown. The view that it’s like the flu, just let people get it until immunity rises, while keeping old and sick people safe, is predicated on the idea that there are few long term consequences other than death. 

 If 20% are getting long term important debilitation, that skews the treadeoff to less contact.  If this were the plague or cholera, with 50% death, we would not be talking about herd immunity.

3) Testing. The article is missing the one great opportunity we have to reduce the spread and reduce the social and economic cost of the disease, until a vaccine becomes available. "Test" only appears in the article in the section on protecting the elderly and nursing homes. This is the great unexploited opportunity. We can cheaply reduce the contact rate with next to no business or social cost.

Why in the world are we not embarking on widespread public-health testing? Why is the FDA still regulating tests, saying they may only be performed in a medical setting?  By what possible right or common sense can the FDA tell me that I cannot send samples of my body to a lab, and the lab cannot tell me what’s in them? Read Alex Tabarrok "our antigens, ourselves" to get really grumpy about this. You have to be astoundingly paternalistic about the stupid deplorable to believe that people need to be protected from simple information about what is in their body. There is zero medical danger from a saliva test. 

This thing could be over in  weeks if the FDA allowed cheap, fast, relatively inaccurate, cash-and-carry, completely unregulated tests. Go to CVS, get the test kit, find out if you have it. No referral, no doctor visit, no prescription, no insurance, no faxed paperwork. Let private decisions figure out what to do with the results. Businesses, restaurants, schools could all demand it. With a cheap test, the contact rate can go below one and we need no immunity. Of course, the government has every interest in paying for and subsidizing tests too. 

Frankly I do not understand this Administration. If President Trump simply tweeted, "FDA: Free the tests!" and "CDC: tell people to get tested" this thing could be over in weeks. We could reach herd immunity with a low contact rate alone, and reastaurants, schools, universities, airlines, could require test results and reopen quickly. Trump could go into the election with the number of cases and deaths crashing. He could campaign in empty hospitals. 

Storm coming

I am very worried about how the next election will play out. I am more worried than most commenters, hence this post, because as an economist I predict people's behavior by asking what is natural given their incentives and the rules of the game as they are. That thinking leads to a dark place.  

Our democracy has one essential function: a peaceful transfer of power. There are rules of the game. A winner is determined even in a close race. Both sides agree who won, and that the winner is a legitimate office holder. 

We seem inexorably headed to the most divisive election since 1860, in which this mantle of legitimacy is sure to vanish, to horrendous result. 

Ruth Bader Gisberg's death adds both distraction from the task of fixing election machinery -- really, agreement by both sides what the rules of the game will be, and to abide by the results -- and one more pathway to disaster. 

Imagine, as seems quite possible, that  Trump scores an early lead in the days after the election, with a narrow electoral college majority, though losing the popular vote, with 90% - 10% losses in the deep blue cities. Trump declares victory. Blue cities erupt in  protest. 

As mail in votes come in and are tabulated, Biden gets closer and closer and by his party's count has won.

Muni haircuts

"Municipal bond investors have to share the burden in state bailouts" writes my colleague Josh Rauh, and he is exactly right.

Background: State and local governments borrowed a lot of money and blew it. They borrowed further by not funding their pensions. Now covid comes along, people are fleeing cities, and they don't have tax revenue to fund ongoing expenses. 

The big question hanging over Washington: If we are going to help state and local governments weather the storm of their current expenses, does that mean federal taxpayers bail out the bondholders who lent state and local governments all this money? 

As in the Greek crisis, bond investors and their allies like to clam "contagion," that any losses will spark a financial crisis.  

Whether that argument has any merit in other cases, as Josh points out it does not hold for municipal bonds in the current financial environment. Municipal bonds are illiquid and tax-exempt and thus well targeted at very wealthy high-income individuals who face high tax rates, and whose saving is thus beyond IRA, 401(k) and other tax-free investment possibilities. And we are not in a systemic financial crisis.  

...as of this spring, around 12 percent of municipal bonds were owned by banks. This implies only about $130 billion of total exposure to all general obligation municipal debt by the banking sector, compared to well above $1 trillion of tier one bank capital. Similar amounts of general obligation municipal debt reside on the balance sheets of the insurance companies, where municipal bonds are 7 percent of assets.

The remaining municipal bonds are directly owned by individuals, or in mutual funds and exchange traded funds largely owned by individuals. Municipal bond defaults would primarily affect individual investors, and especially individuals who buy tax exempt municipal debt because they are looking for tax free income.

Of a piece with the effort to restore the state and local tax deduction, the effort to bail largely blue states and cities out of their debts to largely blue high income taxpayers is just a little bit inconsistent with tax the rich and tax their wealth rhetoric.  

Daniel Bergstresser and Randolph Cohen presented a paper a while ago at a Brookings conference, measuring that 42% of municipal bond value was held by the top 0.5% of the income distribution. Now that so many including the Fed are interested in racial justice, similar breakdowns of who holds municipal bonds would be interesting. Given the racial disparity in wealth, it would be astounding if the disparity in municipal bond holding were not very large as well.   

Josh's solution is straightforward: 

Congress has to therefore condition any further bailout funds on shared losses by municipal bond investors. For instance, the law can mandate that state governments pass legislation that would write off a dollar of municipal bond debt for every dollar of additional grants given to a state or local government.

If we ever are to have any sort of market discipline, if a Fed put is not going to protect all large and politically potent issuers and all large and politically potent investors, who got outsized returns for many years by holding risky assets,  from actually taking those losses when it counts, rather than one more taxpayer bailout, this seems like the time and place. 

Municipal bonds are already highly subsidized, by their tax deduction. State and local governments have responded predictably by borrowing a lot. (Universities also get to borrow at municipal bond rates, and effectively use the money to invest in their hedge-fund endowments.) If municipal bonds now enter the too big to fail regime, the subsidy and incentive to over borrow explodes. 

This situation is part of a general conundrum. The government and the Fed has taken on forestalling bankruptcies of large businesses and governments in the covid recession. (Restaurants, small landlords, and other small businesses no. But AAA bond issuers, and municipal bond issuers yes.) 

To forestall a bankruptcy, you do not just lend money for current operations -- you end up taking on past debts.  

Fortunately the recession seems to be ending quickly, because the magnitude of debt that might end up in federal hands under the no-bondholder-may-lose-money regime is pretty frightening. 

Update

French Translation at Vox-fi

Atlas agonistes

A group of Stanford faculty recently circulated, and then posted, an open letter objecting to my Hoover colleague Scott Atlas, who serves as a senior adviser to the Administration on health policy. 

Read the letter. Then come back for a little reading comprehension test.

****

Q1: What specific "falsehoods and misrepresentations" do they accuse Scott of making?

Q2: Which of the following do they claim Scott is publicly denying, contrary to scientific evidence? 

1. Face masks, social distancing, handwashing and hygiene can help to reduce the spread of Covid-19. 
2. Crowded indoor spaces are dangerous. 
3. Asymptomatic people can spread covid-19
4. Testing asymptomatic people can help to slow the spread. 
5. Children can get Covid-19
6. Pandemics can end via herd immunity. Vaccines work, by conferring herd immunity.
7. Letting people get sick is better than a vaccine. 
8. All of the above  

Q3: What specific documented evidence of statements that contravene contemporary scientific consensus do the signatories provide? 

Q4: What role in the Administration do they cite that Scott has, and misuses? 

(Note present tense. Scott is an adviser. We all get to change our minds -- even Dr. Fauci once said face masks were not worth the bother, but the signatories don't seem to feel an "ethical obligation" to play gotcha on that one. What matters is, what is Scott currently advocating in the Administration?) 

*******

Debt podcast and reconciliation

 

The Grumpy Economist podcast is back, with some thought on the debt issues from my last posts here and here.

David Andofatto had some final thoughts at macro mania, with which I mostly agree. Yes a twitter/blog debate in macroeconomics produces agreement! Central points: 

1) For these purposes a large sharp inflation and a default are not much different. In fact, the event I have in mind is most likely an inflation, as the US is likely to choose inflation over default. I don't think I made this equivalence clear in the debt posts. Also, the Fed is just another issuer of interest-paying debt. 

However, I don't think the chance of default or haircut is as remote as everyone else seems to think. They are also related events. Remember, my scenario for a debt crisis posits an economic and political crisis at the same time -- pandemic, recession, war, huge demands on the US treasury. Just how sacrosanct will full repayment of debt be to the US political system? When Chinese central bankers and Wall Street fat-cats are pressing for debt repayment but ordinary Americans are hurting, will our political system really take hard measures to repay the former in full, while throwing everyone's lives into misery via inflation? Maybe, and maybe inflation can still be blamed on speculators and middle-people and the usual bogey-people but maybe not. A haircut on Treasurys is not inconceivable. It could also come via refusal to raise the debt limit, or via a sharp wealth tax. And if people start to fear a haircut coming, they will certainly dump debt immediately, so fear of even technical defaults can spark the inflation.  

2) Yes, a good part of current r<g may well be a liquidity premium for US government debt due to its usefulness in transactions. But the big questions for r<g remain how reliable and how scaleable. Liquidity demand is not very scaleable. For example, if a government is financed only by money and no debt, and money demand MV=PY, then the government can run perpetual small deficits as the real economy Y and hence money demand grow. But if the government sees this situation, says "great, r<g, let's blow $10 trillion bucks," it will soon discover this opportunity does not scale at all. 

In the more reasonable MV(i)=PY that money demand is interest elastic, as the government exploits the opportunity and supplies more M it must pay greater interest on money (interest on reserves, interest on money-like treasurys), eating away quickly at r<g. 

The sensible r<g advocates like Blanchard recognize that r<g does not scale infinitely, and that a rise in r captures its limit. However, the discussion usually goes quickly to crowding out and the marginal product of capital rising. The liquidity effect that depresses US government bond yields is likely much less scaleable than crowding out of the whole US capital stock. 

When you read estimates of how much r rises as debt/GDP rises, pay attention to which mechanism they have in mind. 

Liquidity demand is also more fickle. Money demand can rise and fall quickly. The portion of treasury demand that comes from its use in financial transactions can be undone by different payment and clearing technology. Relying on this poorly understood mechanism for 30 years of r<g to pay off our debt seems a bit risky. US sanctions and regulations are creating a big incentive for others to create such alternative mechanisms. 

3) The government should borrow longer. The Fed can help.  

One of my policy conclusions is that the US government should borrow long-term as households who fear a big rise in interest rates should get 30 year mortgages not adjustable rate mortgages. Currently the Fed is actively undoing the Treasury's meager efforts to borrow long term, by buying up long-term treasury and guaranteed agency debt and issuing overnight reserves in return, and by issuing new debt in the form of overnight debt. 

The Fed could easily introduce term deposits -- reserves that carry a fixed interest rate, rather than a floating rate, and whose principal value varies. The Fed could also engage in fixed-for-floating swap contracts to eliminate the government's exposure to interest rate risk. (Such swap contracts should be collateralized of course, since you don't buy insurance from someone you will bail out if they lose money!) If interest rates rise the Fed will not just rescue the US government from a crisis, but will look like bloody geniuses. Which would you rather as a central banker in a crisis: a huge rise in net worth with which you can bail out the Treasury, or to fight an immense mark-to-market loss? 

Fintech in chains

"Fintech can come out of the shadows" is the title that Wall Street Journal editors gave to  Brian Brooks and Charles Calomiris' oped last week. I have not in a long time seen a title that more utterly contradicts the content of the essay.  For what they advocate is exactly the opposite: Fintech in chains, hemmed in by  the sort of regulatory stranglehold that fintech was created to escape. 

What is fintech? Basically companies that offer  

services—consumer loans, credit cards or payment processing—that banks have traditionally offered.

but, crucially, fintech does not accept deposits. 

The issue? 

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency determines which companies qualify for charters as national banks or federal savings associations and supervises the activities of those banks.

But not fintech companies, because fintech companies don't take deposits. And that is the legal issue prompting the oped -- Brooks and Calomiris, coincidentally acting comptroller of the currency and chief economist of the OCC, want the OCC to regulate fintech just like banks. (Calomiris is a topnotch economist who normally writes very good papers. ) 

So what's so awful about fintech? 

Deflation

 

For another purpose, I had reason to look up TIPS yields. 

The current Treasury Inflation-Protected Security (TIPS) yields are -1.27% (5 years) -0.98% (10 years) and, amazingly, -0.35% (30 years). You pay them 0.35% per year for a stable real value. I did not realize it was this low. 

The context. I serve on the advisory board of a small nonprofit that has an endowment. The endowment is intended to be perpetual. We're discussing the equity vs. fixed income allocation. I wanted to lay out the options. If they want absolute safety of principal and payout, under a perpetual constraint, they can pay out... -0.35% of the principal every year! I advised they accept some risk in the payout stream. 

It is not common for foundations to link the payout rate to the portfolio beta or composition. On economic grounds it should be. If you want a perpetual investment, the payout rate has to relate to the average portfolio return. Fixed income should have a lower payout rate than equity. 

Of course, some payouts are set by IRS rules or by a conflict between managers and donors, and there apparent illogic can serve other purposes.

Latest Goodfellows

The latest Goodfellows discussion. Embedded, hopefully, here: 

or direct link here. (Try that if the embed fails. Youtube has started censoring Hoover.) 

Podcast:

Smoke and Nukes

 I was driving in Northern California on Labor Day, contemplating the 1-2 mile visibility in thick smoke through the Central Valley, and listening to NPR, when an enticing story came along. 

Amna Nawaz:

For a closer look at what's behind that heat wave and what's fueling these fires, I'm joined by Leah Stokes, she's a professor and researcher on climate, energy and political policy at the University of California, Santa Barbara

Great, I thought. We're going to hear some real science and policy. What's the role of forest floor cleaning? Climate warming isn't the issue per se -- it's hot in Arizona but Arizona doesn't burn. It's a complex of moisture, growth human activity. And policy. Great. What do we do about the fact that so much burning land is federal, and the federal government isn't cleaning up its forest floor either. What's the budget history of fire fighters? Just what are the air quality numbers? 

I was, to put it mildly, disappointed.