Monetary union works well in the United States. No economist suggests that New York, New Jersey and Connecticut should each have its own currency, and indeed it would be highly inconvenient if they did. Why can’t Europeans enjoy the conveniences of a common currency?I am a big euro fan. This seems a good moment to explain why I don't accept this conventional view, despite its authority from Milton Friedman to Marty Feldstein and Greg Mankiw and even to Paul Krugman.
Two reasons. First, unlike Europe, the United States has a fiscal union in which prosperous regions of the country subsidize less prosperous ones. Second, the United States has fewer barriers to labor mobility than Europe. In the United States, when an economic downturn affects one region, residents can pack up and find jobs elsewhere. In Europe, differences in language and culture make that response less likely.
As a result, Mr. Friedman and Mr. Feldstein contended that the nations of Europe needed a policy tool to deal with national recessions. That tool was a national monetary policy coupled with flexible exchange rates. Rather than heed their counsel, however, Europe adopted a common currency for much of the Continent and threw national monetary policy into the trash bin of history.
Making matters worse, however, was the common currency. In an earlier era, Greece could have devalued the drachma, making its exports more competitive on world markets. Easy monetary policy would have offset some of the pain from tight fiscal policy. Mr. Friedman and Mr. Feldstein were right: The euro has turned into an economic liability that has exacerbated political tensions. For this, the European elites who pushed for the currency union bear some responsibility.
"The idée fixe that dominates The Global Minotaur, and apparently dominated Mr Varoufakis’s squabbles with the other Eurogroup ministers of finance, is that some countries are inherently more productive than others and therefore always generate current account surpluses, while others always generate deficits, and fixed exchange rates or monetary unions only exacerbate this imbalance. Hence, for the world economy to function, the surpluses need to be recycled though a system of regular transfer payments from the core to the periphery.
Why do these imbalances emerge? According to the theory of comparative advantage as formulated by David Ricardo in the early 19th century, different countries specialise in the production of particular goods and then exchange them for others, and trade is mutually beneficial even if some countries are more efficient at producing all goods. Mr Varoufakis’s theory rejects all this. Instead, he argues, some countries are destined to specialise in the production of goods and services, while others on the periphery will forever specialise in consuming them. Put into layman’s terms, what this means is that the people of Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland produce cars, wooden clogs, or mobile phones and sell them to the people of Greece, who pay for it all with money – and to make this trade sustainable the cash needs to be regularly replenished in an endless loop by the people of Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland.This is a story we hear quite often beyond Mr. Varoufakis -- that a currency union requires countries to be similar, with similar productivity. I'm glad to see it so effectively skewered. In Ricardo's famous example, Portugal sells wine to Britain, which sells wool to Portugal, even if one is better at both than the other. They were on a common currency, gold.
here's a photo I took in the McDonald's on the Champs-Élysées, Paris, of the screens where customers can place their orders and pay. After a short wait, you pick up your burger and fries at the counter.I did not ask just why he is eating at McDonalds in France!
..under the rule, a firm that is identified as a global systemically important bank holding company, or GSIB, will have to hold additional capital...No, capital is not "held." Capital is issued. Capital is a source of funds, not a use of funds. Capital is not reserves. Please all, stop using the word "hold" for capital.
"A key purpose of the capital surcharge is to require the firms themselves to bear the costs that their failure would impose on others," Chair Janet L. Yellen said. "In practice, this final rule will confront these firms with a choice: they must either hold substantially more capital, reducing the likelihood that they will fail, or else they must shrink their systemic footprint, reducing the harm that their failure would do to our financial system. Either outcome would enhance financial stability."Issuing (not holding!) more capital does not make firms "bear costs." Firms never bear costs. They pass costs on to customers, workers, shareholders, or (especially for banks!) the government. The slight argument for higher "costs" is that equity gets to leverage with less subsidized too-big-to-fail debt; that's not a cost, that's a reduction in subsidy. If (if) the cost of equity capital is high by some MM failure, then equity receives higher returns and borrowers pay higher costs. This is a surprising quote. Ms. Yellen is usually accurate in such matters.
Modifying the standard New-Keynesian model to replace firms' full information and sticky prices with flexible prices and dispersed information, and imposing mild and plausible restrictions on the monetary authority's decision rule, produces the striking results that (i) there exists a unique and globally stable steady-state rate of inflation, despite the possibility of a lower bound on nominal interest rates; and (ii) in the vicinity of steady-state, the price level is determinate (and not just the rate of inflation), despite the central bank targeting inflation. ... The model admits a determinate, stable solution with no role for sunspot shocks when the monetary authority responds by less than one-for-one to changes in expected inflation, including under an interest rate peg....I haven't read this one yet either. I'm posting for anyone following these issues. Like Garcia Schmidt and Woodford, I also hope that others will read the papers and help to figure out if they really work as advertised.
..the simplest, and arguably most effective, policy [to avoid financial crises] may well have low long run costs. That policy is to gradually change the funding structure of banks so that they are much better able to deal with shocks by relying less on debt and more on equity...
In this article we examine a wide range of behavioral failures, such as those linked to misperception of risks, unwarranted aversion to risk ambiguity, inordinate aversion to losses, and inconsistencies in the tradeoffs reflected in individual decisions. Although such shortcomings have been documented in the behavioral literature, they are also reflected in government policies, both because policymakers are also human and because public pressures incorporate these biases. The result is that government policies often institutionalize rather than overcome behavioral anomalies.I haven't read it, but it seems interesting, and the field seems wide open. The defense of freedom never was that freedom is perfect, merely that government control is worse.
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| Source: Deutsche Bank Research |
My proposal begins with government action to write down the value of all euro-denominated contracts enforced within Greece. This “redenomination” would make all existing contracts – wages, pensions, deposits, and loans – legally worth only, say, 70% of their current nominal value. This policy would kill several birds with one stone. It would significantly reduce pensions, relieving fiscal pressure and satisfying troika demands for fiscal sustainability. It would do so in a way that would also mitigate the purchasing power consequences for pensioners, because an across-the-board redenomination would lower prices throughout the economy, making the reduction in nominal pensions more bearable. By applying redenomination to deposits and loans, banks’ health would be revived – their loans would now be payable and therefore more valuable, and their net worth would consequently rise. The 30% wage reduction would further reduce fiscal problems and make Greek producers competitive, and operate as an “internal devaluation” to raise demand for Greek products and tourism. Most importantly, this internal devaluation – by solving the problems of fiscal deficits, non-competitiveness and bank insolvency – would inspire confidence in Athens’ ability to stay within the eurozone, which should bring deposits back into the banking system to fuel a rebirth of lending.I think this is about half right, but a very good idea lies in here.