## Tuesday, September 21, 2021

### Boosters

I was going to write about the FDA's idiotic booster recommendations, and then I found the perfect answer on Marginal Revolution, which I will quote in its entirety for the few readers who don't read MR every day

My first reaction upon hearing that boosters were rejected was to ask the same thing: would these same “experts” say that, because the vaccines are still effective without boosters, vaccinated persons don’t need to wear masks and can resume normal life? Of course not. They use the criterion “prevents hospitalization” for evaluating boosters (2a) but switch back to “prevents infection” when the question is masks and other restrictions. What about those that are willing to accept the tiny risk of side effects to prevent infection so that they can get back to fully normal life? The Science (TM) tells us that one can’t transmit the virus if one is never infected to begin with.

Also, one of the No votes on boosters said that he feared approval would effectively turn boosters into a mandate and change the definition of fully vaccinated. So, it appears that the overzealousness to demand vaccine mandates has actually contributed to fewer people getting access to (booster) vaccines, thus paradoxically contributing to spread. A vivid illustration of the problem with, “That which is not mandatory should be prohibited.”

The biggest problem with public health professionals continues to be (1) elevation of their own normative value judgements — namely that NPIs are no big deal no matter how long they last — which have nothing to do with scientific expertise, (2) leading them to “shade” their interpretation of data to promote their preferred behavioral outcome rather than answering positive (non-normative) questions with positive scientific statements, (3) thus undermining the credibility of public health institutions (FDA, CDC) and leading to things like vaccine hesitancy.

What happened to the idea that the FDA's job is to proclaim only whether a vaccine is safe and effective? Then if you want to take it, that's up to you? (And we could argue about even that, i.e. whether "safe" is enough, whether FDA should have authority to make something unproven illegal, etc.)

I want a booster. Pfizer wants to sell me a booster. The data say it's safe and effective. Way more effective than masks. Period.

They hypocrisy on masks vs. boosters is amazing.

## Monday, September 20, 2021

### Debt ceiling modest proposal -- perpetuities

The debt ceiling dance has started again. Read Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in the Wall Street Journal

A modest proposal: Issue perpetuities.

The Treasury computes the total amount of debt by its face or principal value, not its market value*. If the Treasury issues a bond that pays $1 coupons each year for 10 years and then pays$100 at maturity, the treasury counts this as $100 additional debt. The Treasury ignores the coupon payments, and how much the bond actually sells for, i.e. how much the Treasury actually borrows, when the bond is auctioned. Now you see my answer: Perpetuities have coupons, but no principal. A perpetuity pays$1 forever. In reality, it pays $1 until the Treasury buys it back. The Treasury could also issue coupon-only debt, just the$2 coupons for 10 years. Or it could issue debt with huge coupons and small principal payments, $2 a year for 10 years and then an additional dollar in year 10, and say debt increases by$1. But perpetuities are great for all sorts of other reasons, so why not use this opportunity?

Perpetuities can have fixed coupon payments or variable coupons. The Treasury could sell a perpetual bond whose interest rate equals SOFR (the new Libor), whatever the Fed is paying on excess reserves, etc. If the Treasury wants to borrow short to harvest temporarily low short-term interest rates, then floating-rate perpetuities do the trick. Of course I would rather also take this moment to start borrowing long, locking in absurdly low interest costs.

The Treasury could lower debt outstanding now, by rolling debt into perpetuities, issuing new perpetuities, and buying debt on the open market, issuing perpetuities in return. Goodbye debt limit.

Too clever? Maybe. OK, undoubtedly yes. But if economics lunchroom talk can consider trillion-dollar coins, we can talk about perpetuities. Or maybe a serious attempt to do this would bring US treasury accounting into the 1960s, with cutting-edge concepts like market values not face values,  duration not average principal maturity, and interest cost concept that goes beyond coupons, so that the debt limit and treasury accounting is more economically meaningful.

Disclaimers:

*I spent some time on google and the Treasury website trying to figure out just how debt subject to limit is calculated, and this is my best guess. If I'm wrong, please write and I'll issue a classic "never mind."

Yes, I am guilty here of having the same answer in response to different questions. See here on why I like perpetuities for other reasons.

## Friday, September 17, 2021

### Inflation, debt, politics, and insurance at Project Syndicate

An essay at Project Syndicate

Inflation in the Shadow of Debt

Today’s inflation is transitory, our central bankers assure us. It will go away on its own. But what if it does not? Central banks will have “the tools” to deal with inflation, they tell us. But just what are those tools? Do central banks have the will to use them, and will governments allow them to do so?

Should inflation continue to surge, central banks’ main tool is to raise interest rates sharply, and keep them high for several years, even if that causes a painful recession, as it did in the early 1980s. How much pain, and how deep of a dip, would it take? The well-respected Taylor rule (named after my Hoover Institution colleague John B. Taylor) recommends that interest rates rise one and a half times as much as inflation. So, if inflation rises from 2% to 5%, interest rates should rise by 4.5 percentage points. Add a baseline of 2% for the inflation target and 1% for the long-run real rate of interest, and the rule recommends a central-bank rate of 7.5%. If inflation accelerates further before central banks act, reining it in could require the 15% interest rates of the early 1980s.

Would central banks do that? If they did, would high interest rates control inflation in today’s economy? There are many reasons for worry.

Monetary policy lives in the shadow of debt. US federal debt held by the public was about 25% of GDP in 1980, when US Federal Reserve Board Chair Paul Volcker started raising rates to tame inflation. Now, it is 100% of GDP and rising quickly, with no end in sight. When the Fed raises interest rates one percentage point, it raises the interest costs on debt by one percentage point, and, at 100% debt-to-GDP, 1% of GDP is around $227 billion. A 7.5% interest rate therefore creates interest costs of 7.5% of GDP, or$1.7 trillion.

Where will those trillions of dollars come from? Congress could drastically cut spending or find ways to increase tax revenues. Alternatively, the US Treasury could try to borrow additional trillions. But for that option to work, bond buyers must be convinced that a future Congress will cut spending or raise tax revenues by the same trillions of dollars, plus interest. Even if investors seem confident at the moment, we cannot assume that they will remain so indefinitely, especially if additional borrowing serves only to pay higher interest on existing debt. Even for the United States, there is a point at which bond investors see the end coming, and demand even higher interest rates as a risk premium, thereby raising debt costs even more, in a spiral that leads to a debt crisis or to a sharp and uncontrollable surge of inflation. If the US government could borrow arbitrary amounts and never worry about repayment, it could send its citizens checks forever and nobody would have to work or pay taxes again. Alas, we do not live in that fanciful world.

In sum, for higher interest rates to reduce inflation, higher interest rates must be accompanied by credible and persistent fiscal tightening, now or later. If the fiscal tightening does not come, the monetary policy will eventually fail to contain inflation.

This is a perfectly standard proposition, though it is often overlooked when discussing the US and Europe. It is embodied in the models used by the Fed and other central banks. [Previous post here on just what that means.] It was standard IMF advice for decades.

Successful inflation and currency stabilization almost always includes monetary and fiscal reform, and usually microeconomic reform. The role of fiscal and microeconomic reform is to generate sustainably higher tax revenues by boosting economic growth and broadening the tax base, rather than with sharply higher and growth-reducing marginal tax rates. Many attempts at monetary stabilization have fallen apart because the fiscal or microeconomic reforms failed. Latin-American economic history is full of such episodes.

Even the US experience in the 1980s conforms to this pattern. The high interest rates of the early 1980s raised interest costs on the US national debt, contributing to most of the then-large annual “Reagan deficits.” Even after inflation declined, interest rates remained high, arguably because markets were worried that inflation would come surging back.

So, why did the US inflation-stabilization effort succeed in the1980s, after failing twice before in the 1970s, and countless times in other countries? In addition to the Fed remaining steadfast and the Reagan administration supporting it through two bruising recessions, the US undertook a series of important tax and microeconomic reforms, most notably the 1982 and 1986 tax reforms, which sharply lowered marginal rates, and market-oriented regulatory reforms starting with the Carter-era deregulation of trucking, air transport, and finance.

The US experienced a two-decade economic boom. A larger GDP boosted tax revenues, enabling debt repayment despite high real-interest rates. By the late 1990s, strange as it sounds now, economists were actually worrying about how financial markets would work once all US Treasury debt had been paid off. The boom was arguably a result of these monetary, fiscal, and microeconomic reforms, though we do not need to argue the cause and effect of this history. Even if the economic boom that produced fiscal surpluses was coincidental with tax and regulatory reform, the fact remains that the US government successfully paid off its debt, including debt incurred from the high interest costs of the early 1980s. Had it not done so, inflation would have returned.

The Borrower Ducks

But would that kind of successful stabilization happen now, with the US national debt four times larger and still rising, and with interest costs for a given level of interest rates four times larger than the contentious Reagan deficits? Would Congress really abandon its ambitious spending plans, or raise tax revenues by trillions, all to pay a windfall of interest payments to largely wealthy and foreign bondholders?

Arguably, it would not. If interest costs on the debt were to spiral upward, Congress would likely demand a reversal of the high interest-rate policy. The last time the US debt-to-GDP ratio was 100%, at the end of World War II, the Fed was explicitly instructed to hold down interest costs on US debt, until inflation erupted in the 1950s.

The unraveling can be slow or fast. It takes time for higher interest rates to raise interest costs, as debt is rolled over. The government can borrow as long as people believe that the fiscal reckoning will come in the future. But when people lose that faith, things can unravel quickly and unpredictably.

Will and Politics

Fiscal policy constraints are only the beginning of the Fed’s difficulties. Will the Fed act promptly, before inflation gets out of control? Or will it continue to treat every increase of inflation as “transitory,” to be blamed on whichever price is going up most that month, as it did in the early 1970s?

It is never easy for the Fed to cause a recession, and to stick with its policy through the pain. Nor is it easy for an administration to support the central bank through that kind of long fight. But tolerating a lasting rise in unemployment – concentrated as usual among the disadvantaged – seems especially difficult in today’s political climate, with the Fed loudly pursuing solutions to inequality and inequity in its interpretation of its mandate to pursue “maximum employment.”

Moreover, the ensuing recession would likely be more severe. Inflation can be stabilized with little recession if people really believe the policy will be seen through. But if they think it is a fleeting attempt that may be reversed, the associated downturn will be worse.

One might think this debate can be postponed until we see if inflation really is transitory or not. But the issue matters now. Fighting inflation is much easier if inflation expectations do not rise. Our central banks insist that inflation expectations are “anchored.” But by what mechanism? Well, by the faith that those same central banks would, if necessary, reapply the harsh Volcker medicine of the 1980s to contain inflation. How long will that faith last? When does the anchor become a sail?

A military or foreign-policy analogy is helpful. Fighting inflation is like deterring an enemy. If you just say you have “the tools,” that’s not very scary. If you tell the enemy what the tools are, show that they all are in shiny working order, and demonstrate that you have the will to use them no matter the pain inflicted on yourself, deterrence is much more likely.

Yet the Fed has been remarkably silent on just what the “tools” are, and just how ready it is to deploy those tools, no matter how painful doing so may be. There has been no parading of materiel. The Fed continues to follow the opposite strategy: a determined effort to stimulate the economy and to raise inflation and inflation expectations, by promising no-matter-what stimulus. The Fed is still trying to deter deflation, and says it will let inflation run above target for a while in an attempt to reduce unemployment, as it did in the 1970s. It has also precommitted not to raise interest rates for a fixed period of time, rather than for as long as required economic conditions remain, which has the same counterproductive result as announcing military withdrawals on specific dates. Like much of the US government, the Fed is consumed with race, inequality, and climate change, and thus is distracted from deterring its traditional enemies.

An amazing opportunity to avoid this conundrum beckons, but it won’t beckon forever. The US government is like a homeowner who steps outside, smells smoke, and is greeted by a salesman offering fire insurance. So far, the government has declined the offer because it doesn’t want to pay the premium. There is still time to reconsider that choice.

Higher interest rates raise interest costs only because the US has financed its debts largely by rolling over short-term debt, rather than by issuing long-term bonds. The Fed has compounded this problem by buying up large quantities of long-term debt and issuing overnight debt – reserves – in return.

The US government is like any homeowner in this regard. It can choose the adjustable-rate mortgage, which offers a low initial rate, but will lead to sharply higher payments if interest rates rise. Or it can choose the 30-year (or longer) fixed-rate mortgage, which requires a larger initial rate but offers 30 years of protection against interest-rate increases.

Right now, the one-year Treasury rate is 0.07%, the ten-year rate is 1.3%, and the 30-year rate is 1.9%. Each one-year bond saves the US government about two percentage points of interest cost as long as rates stay where they are. But 2% is still negative in real terms. Two percentage points is the insurance premium for eliminating the chance of a debt crisis for 30 years, and for making sure the Fed can fight inflation if it needs to do so. I am not alone in thinking that this seems like inexpensive insurance. Even former US Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence H. Summers has changed his previous view to argue that the US should move swiftly to long-term debt.

But it’s a limited-time opportunity. Countries that start to encounter debt problems generally face higher long-term interest rates, which forces them to borrow short-term and expose themselves to the attendant dangers. When the house down the street is on fire, the insurance salesman disappears, or charges an exorbitant rate.

Bottom line

Will the current inflation surge turn out to be transitory, or will it continue? The answer depends on our central banks and our governments. If people believe that fiscal and monetary authorities are ready to do what it takes to contain breakout inflation, inflation will remain subdued.

Doing what it takes means joint monetary and fiscal stabilization, with growth-oriented microeconomic reforms. It means sticking to that policy through the inevitable political and economic pain. And it means postponing or abandoning grand plans that depend on the exact opposite policies.

If people and markets lose faith that governments will respond to inflation with such policies in the future, inflation will erupt now. And in the shadow of debt and slow economic growth, central banks cannot control inflation on their own.

*********

PS, I don't know if the ads that come up on project syndicate are common or are tailored to me. In either case, if you know me at all, you will find the ad choice rather humorous. PS asked me to write because they felt the need for some intellectual diversity, and I guess it shows!

## Friday, September 10, 2021

### Inflation in the shadow of debt

(Note: This post uses mathjax equations. If you see garbled latex code, come to the original source.)

The effect of monetary policy on inflation depends crucially on fiscal policy.

In standard new-Keynesian models, of the type used throughout the Fed, ECB, and similar institutions, for the central bank to reduce inflation by raising interest rates, there must be a contemporaneous fiscal tightening. If fiscal policy does not tighten, the Fed will not lower inflation by raising interest rates.

The warning for today is obvious: Fiscal policy is on a tear, and not about to tighten any time soon no matter what central banks do. An interest rate rise might not, then, provoke the expected decline in inflation.

Here is a very stripped down model to show the point. \begin{align*} x_t & = E_t x_{t+1} - \sigma(i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) \\ \pi_t & = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t \\ i_t &= \phi \pi_t + u_t \\ \Delta E_{t+1}\pi_{t+1} & = - \sum_{j=0}^\infty \rho^j \Delta E_{t+1} \tilde{s}_{t+1+j} + \sum_{j=1}^\infty \rho^j \Delta E_{t+1}(i_{t+j}-\pi_{t+1+j}) \end{align*} The first two equations are the IS and Phillips curves of a standard new-Keynesian model. The third equation is the monetary policy rule.

The fourth equation stems from the condition that the value of debt equals the present value of surpluses. This condition is also a part of the standard new-Keynesian model. We're not doing fiscal theory here. Fiscal policy is assumed to be "passive:" Surpluses adjust to whatever inflation results from monetary policy. For example, if monetary policy induces a big deflation, that raises the real value of nominal debt, so real primary surpluses must raise to pay the now larger value of the debt. Since it just determines surpluses given everything else, this equation is often omitted, or relegated to a footnote, but it is there. Today, we just look at the surpluses. Without them, the Fed's monetary policy cannot produce the inflation path it desires.

Notation: $$\Delta E_{t+1} \equiv E_{t+1}-E_t$$, $$\rho$$ is a constant of approximation slightly less than or equal to one, $$\tilde{s}$$ is the real primary surplus relative to debt. For example, $$\tilde{s}=0.01$$ means the surplus is 1% of the value of debt, or 1% of GDP at current 100% debt to GDP. The last term captures a discount rate effect. If real interest rates are higher, that lowers the present value of surpluses. Equivalently, higher real interest rates raise the interest costs in the deficit, requiring still higher primary surpluses to pay off debt. (Reference: Equation (4.23) of Fiscal Theory of the Price Level.) $$x$$ is the output gap, $$\pi$$ is inflation, $$s$$ is the real primary surplus, $$i$$ is the interest rate, and the Greek letters are parameters.

Now, suppose the Fed raises interest rates $$\{i_t\}$$ following a standard AR(1). with coefficient $$\eta = 0.6$$. However, there are multiple $$\{u_t\}$$ which produce the same path for $$\{i_t\}$$, each of which produces a different inflation path $$\{\pi_t\}$$. Each of them also produces a different fiscal response $$\{s_t\}$$. So, let's look for given (AR(1)) interest rate $$\{i_t\}$$ path at the different possible inflation $$\{\pi_t\}$$ paths, their associated monetary policy disturbance $$\{u_t\}$$ and their associated fiscal underpinnings.

The top left panel shows a standard result. The interest rate in blue rises, and then returns following an AR(1). Here, the 1% interest rate rise causes a 1% inflation decline, shown in red. I use $$\eta=0.6, \sigma = 1, \kappa = 0.25, \beta = 0.95, \phi = 1.2$$ The monetary policy disturbance $$u_t$$, dashed magenta.  is even larger than the actual inflation rise, but $$i_t = \phi \pi_t + u_t$$ and  the disinflation in $$\pi_t$$ bring the interest rate to a lower value.

Now, let's calculate the implied "passive" surplus response. I use $$\rho=1$$. With a 1% disinflation, the present value of surpluses must rise by 1%. However, the real interest rate rises substantially and persistently. From a present value point of view, that higher discount rate devalues government debt, an inflationary force.  From an ex-post point of view the higher real rates lead to years of higher debt service costs. Viewed either way, the constant-discounted sum of surpluses must rise by even more than one percent. In this case, the sum of surpluses must rise by 3.55, meaning 3.55 percent of debt or 3.55 percent of GDP at 100% debt to GDP ratio, or about $700 billion dollars. What if Congress looks at that and just laughs? Well, the Fed must do something else. The top right panel has a different disturbance process $$\{u_t\}$$. This disturbance produces exactly the same path of interest rates, shown in blue. But it produces half as much initial deflation, -0.5%. The disinflation also turns to slight inflation after 3 years. With less disinflation, there is less need to produce a larger value of government debt, so the sum of surpluses must only rise by 2.23%. The bottom left shows a case that inflation does not decline at all, though again the path of interest rates is exactly the same. This occurs with a different disturbance $$\{u_t\}$$ as shown. Finally, in the bottom right, it is possible that this interest rate rise produces 0.5% inflation. In this case, fiscal policy produces a slight deficit. The case of no change in surplus or deficit occurs between 0% and 0.5% inflation. To reiterate the point, the observable path of interest rates is exactly the same in all four cases. In a new-Keynesian model, the difference is the dynamic path of the monetary policy disturbance. Different underlying disturbances then produce the different inflation outcomes, and the different requirements for the "passive" fiscal policy authorities. Of course (I can't help myself here) to a fiscal theorist the $$\{u_t\}$$ business is meaningless. Congress' choice to match the Fed's tightening with its own tightening produces the deflationary path, and if Congress does not do so, we get an inflationary path. Looked at either way, in a totally standard new-Keynesian model, the effects of an interest rate rise depend crucially on fiscal policy. If fiscal policy does not agree to tighten along with an interest rate rise, the interest rate rise will not produce lower inflation. Hat tip: This point emerged out of discussions with Eric Leeper on his 2021 Jackson Hole paper on fiscal-monetary interactions. The next post, an essay at Project Syndicate, provides larger context. ********** Calculations. To produce the plots I write the monetary policy rule in a different form $i_t = i^\ast_t + \phi ( \pi_t - \pi^\ast_t)$ $i^\ast_t = \eta i^\ast_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$ Then I can specify directly the interest rate AR(1) in $$i^\ast_t$$, and the initial inflation in $$\pi^\ast_t$$. These forms are equivalent. Indeed, I construct $$u_t = i^\ast_t - \phi \pi^\ast_t$$ in order to plot it. I use the analytical solutions for inflation given an interest rate path derived 26.4 of Fiscal Theory, $\pi_{t+1}=\frac{\sigma\kappa}{\lambda_{1}-\lambda_{2}}\left[ i_{t}+\sum _{j=1}^{\infty}\lambda_{1}^{-j}i_{t-j}+\sum_{j=1}^{\infty}\lambda_{2}% ^{j}E_{t+1}i_{t+j}\right] +\sum_{j=0}^{\infty}\lambda_{1}^{-j}\delta_{t+1-j}.$ $\lambda_{1,\ 2}=\frac{\left( 1+\beta+\sigma\kappa\right) \pm\sqrt{\left( 1+\beta+\sigma\kappa\right) ^{2}-4\beta}}{2},$ Matlab code: T = 50; sig = 1; kap = 0.25; eta = 0.6; bet = 0.95; phi = 1.2; pi1 = [-1 -0.5 0 0.5]; lam1 = ((1+bet+sig*kap)+ ((1+bet+sig*kap)^2-4*bet)^0.5)/2; lam2 = ((1+bet+sig*kap)- ((1+bet+sig*kap)^2-4*bet)^0.5)/2; lam1i = lam1^(-1); delt = pi1 - sig*kap/(lam1-lam2)*lam2/(1-lam2*eta); tim = (0:1:T-1)'; pit = zeros(T,1); pit(2) = sig*kap/(lam1-lam2)*lam2/(1-lam2*eta) ; % t=1 pit(3) = sig*kap/(lam1-lam2)*(1/(1-lam2*eta)) ; for indx = 4:T; pit(indx) = sig*kap/(lam1-lam2)*... (eta^(indx-3)/(1-lam2*eta) + lam1i*(eta^(indx-3)-lam1i^(indx-3))/(eta-lam1i) ); end; pim = [pit*(1+0*pi1) + [0*delt;(lam1i.^((0:T-2)')).*delt]]; it = [0; eta.^(0:1:T-2)']; um = it*(1+0*pi1) - phi*pim; rterm = sum(it(2:end-1,:)-pim(3:end,:)); sterm = rterm-pim(2,:); disp('r'); disp(rterm); disp('s'); disp(sterm); if 0; % all together figure; C = colororder; hold on plot(tim,pim,'-r','linewidth',2); plot(tim,um,'--m','linewidth',2); plot(tim,it,'-b','linewidth',2); plot(tim,0*tim,'-k') axis([ 0 6 -inf inf]) end; figure; % 4 panel plot for indx = 1:4; subplot(2,2,indx); hold on; plot(tim,pim(:,indx),'-r','linewidth',2); if indx == 1; text(1.8,-0.7,'\pi','color','r','fontsize',18) text(1,0.7,'i','color','b','fontsize',18); text(2.4,1,'u','color','m','fontsize',18) end plot(tim,um(:,indx),'--m','linewidth',2); plot(tim,it,'-b','linewidth',2); plot(tim,0*tim,'-k') title(['\Sigma s = ' num2str(sterm(indx),'%4.2f')],'fontsize',16) axis([ 0 6 -1 1.5]) end if eta == 0.6 print -dpng nk_fiscal_1.png end ### Sowell on grand movements A correspondent sends me this gem from Tom Sowell: This was written in 1995. So no, he was not talking about any of the great causes that inundate us today. He was writing about causes in the 20th century going back to eugenics. But it seems both prescient and timeless. Source The Vision of the Anointed, link takes you to Google books where you can read a lot of it. ## Tuesday, September 7, 2021 ### Climate economics An essay on climate economics at National Review *** Climate policy is ultimately an economic question. How much does climate change hurt? How much do various policy ideas actually help, and what do they cost? You don’t have to argue with one line of the IPCC scientific reports to disagree with climate policy that doesn’t make economic sense. Climate policy is usually framed in terms of economic costs and benefits. We should spend some money now, or accept reduced incomes by holding back on carbon emissions, in order to mitigate climate change and provide a better future economy. But the best guesses of the economic impact of climate change are surprisingly small. The U.N.’s IPCC finds that a (large) temperature rise of 3.66°C by 2100 means a loss of 2.6 percent of global GDP. Even extreme assumptions about climate and lack of mitigation or adaptation strain to find a cost greater than 5 percent of GDP by the year 2100. Now, 5 percent of GDP is a lot of money —$1 trillion of our $20 trillion GDP today. But 5 percent of GDP in 80 years is couch change in the annals of economics. Even our sclerotic post-2000 real GDP grows at a 2 percent annual rate. At that rate, in 2100, the U.S. will have real GDP 400 percent greater than now, as even the IPCC readily admits. At 3 percent compound growth, the U.S. will produce, and people will earn, 1,000 percent more GDP than now. Yes, that can happen. From 1940 to 2000, U.S. GDP grew from$1,331 billion to $13,138 billion in 2012 dollars, a factor of ten in just 60 years, and a 3.8 percent compound annual growth rate. Five percent of GDP is only two to three years of lost growth. Climate change means that in 2100, absent climate policy or much adaptation, we will live at what 2097 levels would be if climate change were to magically disappear. We will be only 380 percent better off. Or maybe only 950 percent better off. Northern Europe has per capita GDP about 40 percent lower than that of the U.S., eight times or more the potential damage of climate change. Europe is a nice place to live. Many Europeans argue that their more extensive welfare states and greater economic regulation are worth the cost. But it is a cost, which makes climate change look rather less apocalyptic. ## Thursday, September 2, 2021 ### ESG catch 22 The point of ESG investing is to lower the stock price and raise the cost of capital of disfavored industries, and therefore slow down their investment. It's a form of boycott. The cost of capital is the expected return. If it works, it raises expected returns of disfavored industries, and lowers the expected return of favored ones. Yet ESG advocates claim that you do not have to trade return for virtue, that you can even make alpha by ESG investing! If that is the case, it means ESG investing does not work! Take your pick. Why do ESG advocates care? It seems perfectly normal to say, "Look, this little boycott is going to cost you something but it's worth it to save the planet and other social goals." The problem is, most funds are handled by intermediaries who are not allowed to lose a little money on your behalf in return for their idea of virtue, for the simple reason that it may not be your idea of virtue. A mutual fund marketed this way cannot sell to a pension fund, even if the mutual fund and pension fund managers all agree completely on what environment, social, and governance criteria are valid, because neither knows that the recipients of pension fund money have the same preferences. Our laws and regulations occasionally do make some sense! But if you don't lose money on ESG investing, ESG investing doesn't work. Take your pick. (HT, thoughts resulting from Jonathan Berk and Jules van Binsbergen's paper on ESG returns.) ## Monday, August 23, 2021 ### Math education -- or not Percy Deift, Svetlana Jitomirskaya, and Sergiu Klainerman have a well-informed essay at Quillette on the state of math education in the US and China. Italics are mine throughout. I did not copy over the links, but the article is full of documentation. The most interesting part is the economics and politics of math education: One obvious problem lies in the way teachers are trained. The vast majority of K-12 math teachers in the United States are graduates of programs that teach little in the way of substantive mathematics beyond so-called math methods courses (which focus on such topics as “understanding the complexities of diverse, multiple-ability classrooms”). ... At the same time, math majors—who can arrive in the classroom pre-equipped with substantive mathematics knowledge—must go through the process of teacher certification before they can teach math in most public schools, a costly and time-consuming prerequisite. The policy justification for this is that all teachers need pedagogical training to perform effectively. But to our knowledge, this claim isn’t supported by the experience of other advanced countries. Moreover, in those US schools where certification isn’t required, such as in many charter and private schools, math majors and PhDs are in great demand, and the quality of math instruction they provide is often superior.... An even bigger problem, in our view, is that the educational establishment has an almost complete lock on the content taught in our schools, with little input from the university math community. This unusual feature of American policymaking has led to a constant stream of ill-advised and dumbed-down “reforms,”... ## Wednesday, August 18, 2021 ### Masks redux My previous post on Delta policy and masks led to some discussion that went off the rails, on twitter especially. An effort to summarize the point: From the literature I have read, masks can be moderately medically effective. The literature has pretty wide ranging estimates, from some studies and meta-studies saying no effect, and others saying substantial effects. Delta has a reproduction rate of 6. (Again, best guesses with varying estimates.) Even if masks are 50% effective -- which is wildly optimistic -- they reduce the reproduction rate to 3. That's more than the alpha covid with no masks. Each person who gets it passes it on to three people, about every two weeks. If one wishes to stop the virus, only one goal matters: Getting the reproduction rate below one. e to the 3 t is not a lot less exponential growth than e to the 6 t. (With t in two-week or so intervals.) Thus a public policy response that focuses exclusively on fine-tuning mask mandates, depending on the current level of infection is bound to fail its stated goal. That is the point. If our policy makers were willing to say "we are passing the mask mandate so it rips through the population a little bit slower" I might not be so grumpy. I am glad to see vaccine incentives finally percolating out, too slowly and late. I don't know that vaccines bring R0 below one, but they're darn close. You beat exponential growth when case levels are low, not by waiting until there is a crush. ## Thursday, August 12, 2021 ### Goodfellows returns The goodfellows video and podcast returns! Direct link, in case the above embed doesn't work for you. This week's show is about covid and Afghanistan -- America gives up. One reason I love doing this show is that I get to ask questions about things like Afghanistan, military history, what is the nature of military defeat, and so on that I don't know much about, but Niall and H.R. know a lot about! There is little in life I enjoy so much as spouting off a hare-brained opinion and then someone really knowledgeable like Niall and H.R. swats it down and turns me around. Don't miss Niall and H.R. starting at 56:45. I wish I were this eloquent, and I'm proud of my fellow panelists for their deeply knowledgeable empathy. ## Tuesday, August 10, 2021 ### Adumbrations of FDA Scott Alexander's Adumbrations Of Aducanumab is a great review of FDA snafus -- with deeper lessons about regulation in general. Yes the outcome is dumb, but incentives are to blame. That's important to understand if we are ever to fix this mess. Scott has some great ideas for fixing the FDA's incentives. The one I like best is to reduce its power. FDA approval currently means that insurance companies and the government must pay for drugs. Break that link. The FDA now either decides safe&effective vs. not-yet-proven, and makes taking any not-yet-proven drug illegal. Reduce the FDA to simply providing information about what's known about drugs. Finally, give the FDA budgetary rewards for approving drugs. Bemoaning regulatory idiocy is fun but gets us nowhere. Anything persistently busted is not the result of stupidity, it is the result of bad incentives. FDA, CDC and Covid The story of the FDA in covid is a good place to start. It's well known by now, but we are now in the era of forgetting, and it is to nobody's interest to keep this memory alive. The countries that got through COVID the best (eg South Korea and Taiwan) controlled it through test-and-trace. This allowed them to scrape by with minimal lockdown and almost no deaths. But it only worked because they started testing and tracing really quickly - almost the moment they learned that the coronavirus existed. Could the US have done equally well? I think yes. A bunch of laboratories, universities, and health care groups came up with COVID tests before the virus was even in the US, and were 100% ready to deploy them. As with vaccines, which took a weekend to create, the state of medical science is such that really there is no reason to have pandemics any more. Public policy? Well, that's stuck in the 1700s. But when the US declared that the coronavirus was a “public health emergency”, the FDA announced that the emergency was so grave that they were banning all coronavirus testing, so that nobody could take advantage of the emergency to peddle shoddy tests. Perhaps you might feel like this is exactly the opposite of what you should do during an emergency? This is a sure sign that you will never work for the FDA. ## Monday, August 9, 2021 ### Covid incompetence WWII started badly for the United States. Our tanks blew up. Our torpedoes were duds. Our airplanes were outclassed. Many commanders were incompetent, soldiers green, supplies chaotic. We lost a lot of battles. But we learned. The lessons of each mistake were incorporated, incompetent commanders sacked, soldiers learned their terrible craft. Delta is the fourth wave of covid, and amazingly the US policy response is even more irresolute than the first time around. Our government is like a child, sent next door to get a cup of sugar, who gets as far as the front stoop and then wanders off following a puppy. The policy response is now focused on the most medically ineffective but most politically symbolic step, mask mandates. All all-night disco in Provincetown turns in to a superspreader event so... we make school kids wear masks in outdoor summer camps? Masks are several decimal places less effective than vaccines, and less effective than "social distance" in the first place.* Go to that all night disco, unvaccinated, but wear a mask? Please. ## Wednesday, July 21, 2021 ### Climate risk to the financial system I wrote a piece for Project Syndicate, here, on climate financial risk. (This resulted from a presentation on a panel at the NBER summer institute risks of financial institutions meeting, program here. There should be a video version on YouTube but I can't find it. The panel discussion was excellent. You will recognize ideas from my earlier climate finance testimony. I recycle and refine. ) I titled it "an answer in search of a question," but PS didn't like that so we have the "fallacy" title. The essay: In the United States, the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Department of the Treasury are gearing up to incorporate climate policy into US financial regulation, following even more audacious steps in Europe. The justification is that “climate risk” poses a danger to the financial system. But that statement is absurd. Financial regulation is being used to smuggle in climate policies that otherwise would be rejected as unpopular or ineffective. “Climate” means the probability distribution of the weather – the range of potential weather conditions and events, together with their associated probabilities. “Risk” means the unexpected, not changes that everyone knows are underway. And “systemic financial risk” means the possibility that the entire financial system will melt down, as nearly happened in 2008. It does not mean that someone somewhere might lose money because some asset price falls, though central bankers are swiftly enlarging their purview in that direction. In plain language, then, a “climate risk to the financial system” means a sudden, unexpected, large, and widespread change in the probability distribution of the weather, sufficient to cause losses that blow through equity and long-term debt cushions, provoking a system-wide run on short-term debt. This means the five- or at most ten-year horizon over which regulators can begin to assess the risks on financial institutions’ balance sheets. Loans for 2100 have not been made yet. Such an event lies outside any climate science. Hurricanes, heat waves, droughts, and fires have never come close to causing systemic financial crises, and there is no scientifically validated possibility that their frequency and severity will change so drastically to alter this fact in the next ten years. Our modern, diversified, industrialized, service-oriented economy is not that affected by weather – even by headline-making events. Businesses and people are still moving from the cold Rust Belt to hot and hurricane-prone Texas and Florida. If regulators are worried even-handedly about out-of-the-box risks that endanger the financial system, the list should include wars, pandemics, cyberattacks, sovereign-debt crises, political meltdowns, and even asteroid strikes. All but the latter are more likely than climate risk. And if we are worried about flood and fire costs, perhaps we should stop subsidizing building and rebuilding in flood and fire-prone areas. Climate regulatory risk is slightly more plausible. Environmental regulators could turn out to be so incompetent that they damage the economy to the point of creating a systemic run. But that scenario seems far-fetched even to me. Again though, if the question is regulatory risk, then even-handed regulators should demand a wider recognition of all political and regulatory risks. Between the Biden administration’s novel interpretations of antitrust law, the previous administration’s trade policies, and the pervasive political desire to “break up big tech,” there is no shortage of regulatory danger. To be sure, it is not impossible that some terrible climate-related event in the next ten years can provoke a systemic run, though nothing in current science or economics describes such an event. But if that is the fear, the only logical way to protect the financial system is by dramatically raising the amount of equity capital, which protects the financial system against any kind of risk. Risk measurement and technocratic regulation of climate investments, by definition, cannot protect against unknown unknowns or un-modeled “tipping points.” What about “transition risks” and “stranded assets?” Won’t oil and coal companies lose value in the shift to low-carbon energy? Indeed they will. But everyone already knows that. Oil and gas companies will lose more value only if the transition comes faster than expected. And legacy fossil-fuel assets are not funded by short-term debt, as mortgages were in 2008, so losses by their stockholders and bondholders do not imperil the financial system. “Financial stability” does not mean that no investor ever loses money. Moreover, fossil fuels have always been risky. Oil prices turned negative last year, with no broader financial consequences. Coal and its stockholders have already been hammered by climate regulation, with not a hint of financial crisis. More broadly, in the history of technological transitions, financial problems have never come from declining industries. The stock-market crash of 2000 was not caused by losses in the typewriter, film, telegraph, and slide-rule industries. It was the slightly-ahead-of-their-time tech companies that went bust. Similarly, the stock-market crash of 1929 was not caused by plummeting demand for horse-drawn carriages. It was the new radio, movie, automobile, and electric appliance industries that collapsed. If one is worried about the financial risks associated with the energy transition, new astronomically-valued darlings such as Tesla are the danger. The biggest financial danger is a green bubble, fueled as previous booms by government subsidies and central-bank encouragement. Today’s high-fliers are vulnerable to changing political whims and new and better technologies. If regulatory credits dry up or if hydrogen fuel cells displace batteries, Tesla is in trouble. Yet our regulators wish only to encourage investors to pile on. Climate financial regulation is an answer in search of a question. The point is to impose a specific set of policies that cannot pass via regular democratic lawmaking or regular environmental rulemaking, which requires at least a pretense of cost-benefit analysis. These policies include defunding fossil fuels before replacements are in place, and subsidizing battery-powered electric cars, trains, windmills, and photovoltaics – but not nuclear, carbon capture, hydrogen, natural gas, geoengineering, or other promising technologies. But, because financial regulators are not allowed to decide where investment should go and what should be starved of funds, “climate risk to the financial system” is dreamed up and repeated until people believe it, in order to shoehorn these climate policies into financial regulators’ limited legal mandates. Climate change and financial stability are pressing problems. They require coherent, intelligent, scientifically valid policy responses, and promptly. But climate financial regulation will not help the climate, will further politicize central banks, and will destroy their precious independence, while forcing financial companies to devise absurdly fictitious climate-risk assessments will ruin financial regulation. The next crisis will come from some other source. And our climate-obsessed regulators will once again fail utterly to anticipate it – just as a decade’s worth of stress testers never considered the possibility of a pandemic. ***** In retrospect I should have emphasized one point more strongly. Suppose you do believe that there is a "climate risk" to the financial system, a "tipping point" that can happen in the next 5-10 years. Suppose you believe that all our forest fires and floods are the result only of climate change, and might engulf the economy in the next decades. If so, none of the currently advocated policies will do anything about it, especially those implemented by financial regulation. The best the most aggressive climate policies hope to do is to limit the further increase in temperature by 2100. Cutting fossil fuels out of debt markets, printing money to buy windmill and electric car bonds, a full on ESG effort in money management ... none of this will lower carbon dioxide to pre-industrial levels in the next 10 years. None of this will stop wildfires and floods in your great-grandchildren's lifetimes. It follows, that if financial regulators accept even the most climate-alarmist position, and for the goal of protecting the financial system, the policy must be one of rapid adaptation. Spend billions to clear the brush that burns, to build dikes, and certainly not to rebuild crumbling condos on the sea shore. The mantra (I listen to NPR) that each disaster is the result of climate change does not mean that any currently envisioned climate policy is the best, or even vaguely effective, way to combat the chance of such disasters in our lifetimes. Or those of our great-grandchildren. That simple fact does not mean we should ignore the climate, but it does mean that if you truly believe these scenarios, an immense adaptation effort must be undertaken right now. If you don't follow to that conclusion, perhaps you don't really believe that there is a climate financial risk, and this is just a subterfuge to pass policies actually aimed at year 2100 temperatures and having nothing to do with climate risks, by radically un-democratic means. Which is my point. ## Tuesday, July 13, 2021 ### Yellen on climate There was an error in a post with this title, so I have taken it down. Since nothing is ever fully erased on the web, this note states that the earlier one had an error. ## Monday, July 12, 2021 ### Rossi-Hansberg on the effects of a carbon tax I was inspired to think again about climate economics from Esteban Rossi-Habnsberg's excellent presentation at the Hoover Economic Policy Working Group. Link here in case the above embed does not work. Paper here, (with Jose Luis Cruz Alvarez), slides here. Previous introductory post here. There is a lot in this paper and presentation, and I'm going to try to stick to one topic per post. Like most economists, my knee jerk reaction to climate change is "carbon tax." In particular, a carbon tax instead of extensive regulation. Given that we're going to have a climate policy that discourages carbon emissions, a uniform price on carbon emissions is the only sensible and effective way to do it. (Whether tax, tradeable rights, or other mechanism doesn't matter for this purpose.) I would add remove barriers to alternatives, such as nuclear power, and a healthy expenditure on basic science of alternatives. With that in mind, I was stunned by these graphs: Carbon taxes do not stop climate change. They just postpone it. They do postpone it substantially. In the bottom graph, we get 4 degrees rather than 6 by 2100. But still, we're at the same place by 2300. ## Thursday, July 8, 2021 ### How much does climate change actually affect GDP? Part I: An illogical question. How much does climate change* actually affect GDP? How much will currently-envisioned climate policies reduce that damage, and thereby raise GDP? As we prepare to spend trillions and trillions of dollars on climate change, this certainly seems like the important question that economists should have good answers for. I'm looking in to what anyone actually knows about these questions. The answer is surprisingly little, and it seems a ripe area for research. This post begins a series. I haven't gotten deep in this issue before, because of a set of overriding facts and logical problems. I don't see how these will change, but the question frames my investigation. An illogical question The economic effects of climate change are dwarfed by growth Take even worst-case estimates that climate change will lower GDP by 5-10% in the year 2100. Compared to growth, that's couch change. At our current tragically low 2% per year, without even compounding (or in logs), GDP in 2100 will be 160% greater than now. Climate change will make 2100 be as terrible as... 2095 would otherwise be. If we could boost growth to 3% per year, GDP in 2100 will be 240% greater than now, an extra 80 percentage points. 8% in 80 years is one tenth of a percent per year growth. That's tiny. In the 72 years since 1947, US GDP per capita grew from$14,000 to $57,000 in real terms, a 400% increase, and real GDP itself grew from$2,027 T to $19,086 T, a 900% increase. Just returning to the 1945-2000 growth rate would dwarf the effects of climate change and the GDP-increasing effects of climate policy. Comparing the US and Europe, Europe is about 40% below the US in GDP Per Capita, and the the US is about 60% above Europe. So Europe's institutions do on the order of 5-10 times more damage to GDP than climate change. Residential zoning alone costs something like 10-20% of GDP, by keeping people away from high productivity jobs. Abandoning migration restrictions could as much as double world GDP (also here). It is often said that climate change will hit different countries differentially, and poor countries more, so it's an "equity" issue as much as a rich-country GDP issue. Yet just since 1990, China's GDP Per Capita has grown 1,100%, from$729 to $8405 (World bank). As the world got hotter. 1,100% is a lot more than 10%. We'll look at poor country GDP climate effects, but from what I've seen so far, reducing carbon doesn't get 1,100% gains. ## Wednesday, July 7, 2021 ### Lessons learned? Review of a great review. After great events, will the US government and political system learn from mistakes? Or will we raise the bridges and enshrine whatever was done last time as holy writ, to be repeated again? Reputations of people in power push for the latter. But learning from mistakes is the only way to get ahead. Bailouts and stimulus from 2008 seem to have followed the latter possibility. Will the lesson from covid look skeptically on the disastrous performance of CDC and FDA, evaluate whether lockdowns did good commensurate with cost, question the need to spread trillions of newly printed money around, measure the effectiveness of masks that have now become political symbols? Or will this simply be enshrined as the playbook? Do we twist every event to push our partisan narratives, facts be damned? A blame-Trump-for-everything camp offers some hope, but they're not clear what they would do differently as most of the world's response was the same or less effective than our own. This big question frames a must-read Alex Tabarrok Marginal Revolution review of Andy Slavitt’s Preventable. The review doesn't just destroy an otherwise forgettable book, but it really raises these larger questions whether we are so politically polarized that we can no longer learn from mistakes. In contemporary discussion, people can just say things that are blatantly untrue, and it all washes over us. The standard narrative ... leads Slavitt to make blanket assertions—the kind that everyone of a certain type knows to be true–but in fact are false. He writes, for example: In comparison to most of these other countries, the American public was impatient, untrusting, and unaccustomed to sacrificing individual rights for the public good. (p. 65) Data from the Oxford Coronavirus Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) show that the US “sacrifice” as measured by the stringency of the COVID policy response–school closures; workplace closures; restrictions on public gatherings; restrictions on internal movements; mask requirements; testing requirements and so forth–was well within the European and Canadian average. The pandemic and the lockdowns split Americans from their friends and families. Birthdays, anniversaries, even funerals were relegated to Zoom. Jobs and businesses were lost in the millions. Children couldn’t see their friends or even play in the park. Churches and bars were shuttered. Music was silenced. Americans sacrificed plenty. ... Some of Slavitt’s assertions are absurd. The U.S. response to the pandemic differed from the response in other parts of the world largely in the degree to which the government was reluctant to interfere with our system of laissez-faire capitalism… Laissez-faire capitalism??! Political hyperbole paired with lazy writing. It would be laughable except for the fact that such hyperbole biases our thinking. I think the problem is deeper. It's not that this is "hyperbole." It's that this is the sort of mushy sentiment that one can pass around at Washington cocktail parties as easily as write on the front pages of all major media these days, and everyone says yes, sure, without batting an eyelash. It's not hyperbole, it is the unquestioned narrative, it's an inshallah people can add to any statement without question. That's the true danger. ## Wednesday, June 30, 2021 ### Fast grants and the economics of subsidizing science One of the great insights of modern growth theory -- Paul Romer's Nobel Prize -- is that ideas are the foundation of economic growth. Ideas are also "nonrivial." If you use my car, I can't use it, but if you use our family recipe for road-oil chocolate cake (yum), we can still enjoy it as much as ever. Once an idea has been had, economics says it should be used as widely as possible as soon as possible But coming up with ideas is expensive. And aside patent protections, I can't charge for the benefit to you of my new ideas. So, economists naturally notice the mother of all public goods. Research -- finding new ideas -- has enormous benefits, and people will not naturally devote enough resources to finding, refining, implementing new ideas. So, economists conclude, the government should subsidize idea-production. But which ideas? Now we face the conundrum. It's just as easy to subsidize bad idea production as good idea production, and it's even easier to waste money and produce no new ideas at all. How to subsidize actual productive ideas is a hard question of bureaucratic structure. The economics of science is, I think, vastly understudied. How can government agencies or philanthropies give away money and actually do good? This topic is especially relevant as we contemplate a big ramp-up in federal spending. Enter today's topic, a fascinating review of Fast Grants by Patrick Collison, Tyler Cowen, and Patrick Hsu. Read first the Marginal Revolution summary, then the full article I found it as interesting for its insights into the pathologies of our current system for subsidizing research as for its summary of how well fast grants worked. They survey fast grant recipients. Despite being in an evident crisis, and$5 trillion being shoveled out the door...

64% of respondents told us that the work in question wouldn’t have happened without receiving a Fast Grant.

For example, SalivaDirect, the highly successful spit test from Yale University, was not able to get timely funding from its own School of Public Health, even though Yale has an endowment of over \$30 billion. Fast Grants also made numerous grants to UC Berkeley researchers, and the UC Berkeley press office itself reported in May 2020: “One notably absent funder, however, is the federal government. While federal agencies have announced that researchers can apply to repurpose existing funds toward Covid-19 research and have promised new emergency funds to projects focused on the pandemic, disbursement has been painfully slow. …Despite many UC Berkeley proposals submitted to the National Institutes of Health since the pandemic began, none have been granted.” [Emphasis ours.]

## Thursday, June 24, 2021

### Even Finance Professors Lean Left

You may have thought of finance professors at business schools as likely to be a fairly conservative lot, or at least to include a good number of them. You might think finance would be an exception to the growing political monoculture in US academia. You would be mostly wrong.

Emre Kuvvet tracked down the party affiliation of finance professors in the top 20 US departments, and wrote up the results in "Even Finance Professors Lean Left

Berkeley has more Republicans than Chicago? I think numbers are low because so many faculty are not US citizens. It's initially striking  how many finance faculty are not even registered to vote, but I suspect that this reflects the large number of non-US citizens in finance departments.

Here come the millennials... Or, maybe Churchill was right about hearts and brains.

Journal editors:

Not even the JFE can manifest many Republicans!

Of course this is a striking amount of political diversity by the standards of the rest of most universities.

## Thursday, June 17, 2021

### Garicano's conversations with economists

Luis Garicano has just posted a very interesting free e-book, "Capitalism after covid: Conversations with 21 economists." I was honored to be one of his interviewees, video here. Luis has a VoxEU column summarizing conversations, and twitter thread if you like reading such things. Luis is a great interviewer.

This is not an endorsement of all the ideas! Luis found a wide spectrum of ideas, and I think that is the strong thing about the project. You can see how really smart people, on top of the latest academic research, come to still widely different conclusions about the current state of affairs and directions we should go. Though Luis is a pretty free-market Chicago guy, he did not impose that view which I find admirable.

In particular, referring to the VoxEU column, I would take issue with

The bulk of the shock was absorbed by the public sector budget.

That the world could produce such a massive, coherent, and rapid economic response to the pandemic had a lot to do with the consensus that quickly emerged among economists on how best to respond to the unprecedented shock...

Unlike during the Great Financial Crisis, when there was an often-acrimonious debate between economists arguing for austerity and those arguing for stimulus, the priorities were clear:

Central banks should be concerned with maintaining financial stability and providing limitless liquidity to debt markets.

Governments should prioritise the maintenance of household incomes through generous support for workers’ incomes, albeit with different approaches in the US and Europe: significant expansions of unemployment insurance in the US and the general deployment of ‘Kurzarbeit’ in Europe.

Governments should provide ample liquidity facilities to firms, making it possible for them to emerge as undamaged as possible by the lockdowns.

Finally, large, debt-financed public investments would be needed to support the recovery.

I  disagree loudly with just about all of this, and thereby especially enshrining these expedients as "consensus" ready to be deployed at even larger scale in the next pandemic.

If there is consensus on anything it is that our governments completely bungled the public health aspect of this crisis, with the exception of a few countries like South Korea and Taiwan. The FDA and CDC are particularly at fault for blocking testing and vaccines.

Why did covid produce an unprecedented economic collapse, while the 1958 and 1918 flus produced nary a blip of GDP? Because of the completely overdone business lockdowns. The economic shock was caused by the government not by the virus. What good did it do to run up government debts by trillions in order to send checks to retirees and people who were happily working? I'm sure everyone likes more money, but that has nothing to do with covid. Apparently half of expanded unemployment was stolen (I even got notice someone trying to file in my name). " large, debt-financed public investments would be needed to support the recovery." Consensus on that please? Not from here. The recovery is doing fine on its own, and adding more to the abstract sculpture taking place in the Central Valley under the auspices of a high speed train from Bakersfield to Modesto is not going to help. And why is nobody even thinking moral hazard? We now have enshrined a system in which nobody may lose money in a recession, asset prices will be propped up by central banks. Why not lever to the hilt? Why keep some cash around, as there will be no more buying opportunities?

But that Luis interviews such good and prominent economists and finds support for this sort of boondoggle policy is interesting.

Tackling inequality. Over the last few decades, inequality in household income and wealth has increased dramatically in the West.

This is simply not a fact. (See Grumpy coverage of Austen and Spinter here.) Inequality in pre-tax pre-transfer income has increased. Who cares about that? Inequality of mark-to-market wealth has increased as founders stock values have risen. Who cares about that?

Several interviewees explain the progress economists are making in tackling these problems. Atif Mian argues that to reduce inequality, policies must focus on achieving more equitable growth through a significant increase in public investment, and second, on addressing some of the legacies of the imbalances, particularly through an increase in the progressivity of taxation.

Well, if you are a grumpy follower you will find there a well articulated points to disagree with. The US already has the most progressive tax system in the world BTW. And back to more high speed trains to nowhere..

Stefanie Stantcheva discusses how to design better taxes and how to improve people´s understanding of those issues. Oriana Bandiera highlights a significant shift in our understanding of poverty that implies that social assistance programmes, that traditionally were designed to subsidise consumption, should shift to being geared towards investment. Esteban Rossi-Hansberg discusses the concentration of talent and economic activity in cities and the extent to which the ‘Zoom revolution’ will upend this concentration and wonders whether that would be desirable, given the potential loss of positive externalities of physical proximity.

But here are some good-sounding innovative ideas, to give you a sense that economists don't just line up on typical left-right spectrum. I need to read those.

Containing the new leviathan.  It is quite likely that, after the unprecedented policy response to the pandemic, governments will grow permanently larger, leading to an increase in interventionism and, potentially, crony capitalism, as Daron Acemoglu argues. Different countries will sharply diverge in their response to this “critical juncture”. The ones who better succeed will introduce stronger democratic institutions to keep governments in check, as both Acemoglu and Lucrezia Reichlin argue. We also need to improve the way public organisations are managed, a focus of the interviews with Raffaela Sadun and Carol Propper.  Wendy Carlin explains how balancing this larger role for the state requires building a stronger and more resilient civil society – strengthening the ‘third pole’.

This all sounds really interesting. Economics and economists are most interesting when out of the political boxes!

Tackling climate change. ... Reducing carbon emissions, as Michael Greenstone explains in his interview, must be the only priority – not to be confused with delivering the goodies to voters.

Voters and interest groups. Mother Gaia does not care if the electric car charging stations and solar panels are made in the US by union members or made in China at a tenth of the cost.

Yet, after the pandemic, as Nick Stern argues, investing in tackling climate change is the best way to invest for the post-pandemic recovery.

I will not pre-judge, but if this is more broken windows fallacies and create more jobs by using spoons not shovels, I will be skeptical.

In sum, this looks interesting throughout and a good view into the spectrum of analysis that economists are bringing to contemporary issues.

The list of interviewees is

Debt sustainability

Markus Brunnermeier: Let’s compare the central bank to a race car
John Cochrane: Throwing money down ratholes
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde: Economists and the pandemic
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré: How to design a recovery plan

Tackling inequality

Oriana Bandiera: Overcoming poverty barriers
Stefanie Stantcheva: Taxes and social economics
Esteban Rossi-Hansberg: Will working from home kill cities?
Atif Mian: The savings glut of the rich

A more balanced globalisation

Dani Rodrik: Globalisation after the Washington Consensus
Pol Antràs: Is globalisation slowing down?
Michael Pettis: Trade wars are class wars

Containing the new leviathan

Daron Acemoglu: The Great Divergence
Wendy Carlin: The Third Pole
Lucrezia Reichlin: Democratising economic policy
Carol Propper: Targets and terror
Raffaella Sadun: Management for the recovery

Promoting innovation and curbing the power of digital giants

Philippe Aghion: Is ‘cutthroat’ capitalism more innovative?
John Van Reenen: The Lost Einsteins
Fiona Scott Morton: What should we do about big tech?

Combatting global warming

Nicholas Stern: Zero-emissions growth
Michael Greenstone: The real enemy here is carbon